

THE ETHICS OF FORCE

BY

H. E. WARNER

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PREFACE

This little volume had its origin in a series of papers read to the Ethical Club of Washington, D.C., at the time just preceding and following the Spanish War. As it was designed that each should present its special topic with a degree of completeness, it was often necessary at the beginning of successive papers to outline the preceding. It is hoped that such repetitions are not greater than is desirable to keep the whole subject well in mind. While the chapters are in a sense independent, they relate to different phases of the same subject. The popular conceptions of heroism and patriotism are tremendous factors in every war. Differing widely as I do from these popular conceptions, any inference that I hold the things themselves at a lower valuation than others would be most erroneous. What I desire is that the conceptions be recast in the mold of the highest rationality.

To forestall any misconception as to my animus, it may be permissible to mention a circumstance to which I should not otherwise allude. It was my fortune, and in some respects my privilege, to serve in the ranks during the Civil War. Shortly after enlistment I had an attack of fever which nearly proved fatal. This was followed by a brief captivity, in which I had a taste of about all the forms of discomfort which could be had. A year

later a bullet, having deprived me of an important member, terminated my active service, but added many months to my hospital experience. After this I rounded out my military career with another fever. If not much glory fell to my share, I had certainly an almost unique opportunity of seeing war on its seamy side. In spite of this, I am sure that my attitude toward it is not in the least based upon personal grounds. It should be clear, too, that I cannot possibly lack appreciation of and sympathy for the soldier. I may indeed confess that I have not succeeded wholly in ridding myself of the irrational sentiment which attaches itself to the concepts "heroism" and "patriotism," though these are not now satisfied by spelling the words with a capital letter nor by the bursting of firecrackers.

I am under no illusion that this book will have many readers or exert any remarkable influence. A few will, I trust, sympathize with my purpose and find in my labor of love some stimulus for further effort and fresher hope for the race. However this may be, every man born into the world owes it to himself to express, in some way, his deepest convictions; and this debt I have endeavored to pay.

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THE ETHICS OF FORCE

I

INTRODUCTION

That war, in modern times, whatever may have been true in the past, is an enormous economic mistake will hardly be questioned by any well-informed person. Why, then, among civilized peoples in whom the commercial instincts are strong, not to say predominant, does it continue? Partly, no doubt, because it is regarded as inevitable. It is one of the mysterious dispensations of Providence, against which it is held to be useless to strive, and of which it is wrong to complain. Mainly, however, it is because the mass of men fail to realize its burden, or upon whom the burden falls. The government, they somehow think, provides for it. It may be the galled jade, but their withers are unwrung. Our system of indirect taxation, which also prevails in most countries, helps to conceal the facts. If its costs could be rendered in tax bills, to be paid like state, county, and school taxes, war would at once lose most of its popularity. Could it further be realized that every man, woman, and child born into the world, property holders or not, directly or indirectly share in its losses and wastes, it would lose

the rest of it. There would remain a few who, trading upon the necessities of the government in the deranged conditions of affairs and realizing a profit greater than their share in the burdens, would still be in favor of war, quite irrespective of the controversies out of which it might arise.

Still, these are mainly negative reasons and hardly explain the origin of a particular war, as, for example, the recent war in South Africa. To say that it was due to the greed of the British Government or to the obstinacy of President Kruger is easy; but for a nation to pay for a possession or privilege ten times more than it is worth, or for another to court annihilation rather than to make a reasonable concession, points not so much to greed and stubbornness as to stupidity.

In fact, wars are rarely designed. Selfishness and greed on the part of individuals, in both parties to the controversy, exist; but neither the governments nor the persons responsible for the conduct of public business may have anything at stake. Interests clash, and some method of adjustment must be found. This is true everywhere: but if the parties are citizens of the same government, questions between them are settled in the domestic courts; if of different governments, no adequate machinery exists for the purpose, and until the recent establishment of The Hague Court none has existed at all. The governments themselves come to the aid of their citizens and make themselves parties to the dispute. Each claims more than it is entitled to receive, intending to make graceful concessions for the sake of substantial gains. Meantime the commercial interests are insistent

and clamorous for the whole, urging the government to extreme positions. In domestic affairs this would not even be thought of; but their adversaries are foreigners, to whom they owe no duty, not even that of courtesy. The governments are under no compulsion. They can go to war without violating international law. Finally, a point is reached, unexpectedly, where the national honor is involved, and nothing is left but mutual destruction.

But the conception of national honor has been derived from the ideas of heroism and patriotism still found under high civilization. How have these come about? We say sometimes they have been perverted. On the contrary, they are only too faithful a transmission of those which prevailed under a lower culture. They have not developed to meet the changed conditions of life.

Governments do not act upon the highest intelligence of the community, but upon a composite, called public opinion. Perhaps in a degree they cannot do otherwise; but it is most unfortunate if those in authority have no higher standard, intellectual and moral, than that of the average citizen. However this may be, it is clearly futile to hope for the cessation of war through a realization of its wickedness. Wicked for whom? The enemy, of course, always. But if the mass of men can be brought to see its expensiveness, not to a figment called government, but to themselves, to see that national honor does not necessarily require the destruction of persons living under another government, with whom they may differ, and that an economical way of settling these differences is in actual use or perfectly practicable, then war will cease.

I have everywhere assumed that conditions existing at any period of human history are the results of an evolutionary process; but I have here no concern for the theory of evolution itself, nor for the principle to which it owes its efficiency. As to this I claim no right to speak. I was slow to accept evolution as relates to the origin of species. Like the man mentioned by Mr. Fiske, I refused to be called a mammal or the son of a mammal. I was unwilling to recognize my remote simian ancestor, not to speak of tracing descent from a speck of protoplasm. I first observed its process in the law, the manner in which legal principles are evolved, and through which they take shapes widely different from those in which they began. Further consideration showed the same principle at work in language, literature, philosophy, religion, and finally in all forms of social organization. Not that all changes are beneficial. A condition at a given time may be leading forward or backward. The law of the survival of the fittest provides at the same time for the destruction of the unfit. Ideas and institutions grow, culminate, and disappear, in obedience to this law. That it exists in some form in the world of thought and social order there cannot be the slightest question, although Darwin, Wallace, and Huxley all came to the conclusion that the "survival of the fittest" did not account for the mind of man, Mr. Huxley especially excluding the æsthetic and ethical sense. It should be remembered, however, that these men were employed, in the main, with the study of physical forms and organisms rather than with psychic and social development, and that they had no special qualification for the latter

task. Herbert Spencer has applied a form of it to account for all ideas, institutions, and social forms; but his conclusions have not generally been accepted. The principle of utility, in its usual aspect, is not enough to account for the compulsory force in evolution, which takes into its grasp men and things, and compels changes unforeseen and undesired.

This coercive force Mr. Kidd finds in the religious sanction. Religion he defines as "a form of belief providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are subordinated to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing." This definition is defective in at least one respect, as it is the application of the principle of religion to a certain line of conduct which the definition contemplates, not the nature of religion itself. More recently Mr. Kidd has supplemented his theory with the doctrine of projected efficiency, — that is, that an individual or group must not only be fitted to survive in the conditions prevailing in the present, but in those which will prevail in the future. In the movement of the race one who drops out of the ranks is doomed. This, it will be seen, applies more to the social groups than to individuals, whose lives are too short to feel the application of the principle in its full extent.

Mr. Fiske recognized the process of evolution in the formation of ideas and in the social order, but he conceived that in some way there had been a break or change of direction, from which he argues that man is

the highest product of evolution and that, the physical form having been perfected, the process is now at work on the mental and moral nature, and that the psychic nature is or will be so far developed that it will be able to survive the loss of the physical organism.

Whatever the validity of the argument for immortality, I do not believe there has been any break or change of direction in the process of evolution; nor do I agree with Mr. Kidd that an ultra-rational factor forms its coercive power. That religion has in it an ultra-rational element is, I believe, true, as also that it has exercised an enormous and incalculable influence on the race; but religion as much as anything else is a product of evolution. The objection to Mr. Kidd's view, as to that of Mr. Fiske, is that at a given period — the advent of man in the world — the law of evolution has had imposed upon it from the outside a new character or force. No objection is made to the theistic assumption, as I think we must make that in any case. It lies at the very base of reasoning. We can only reason in terms of cause and effect. Evolution in no way explains origins. The process itself was somewhere instituted and put to work in the universe. The "power not ourselves which makes for righteousness" it is at least convenient to call God. But having established a process which has been at work during the entire period of the world's history and which still rigorously holds man in its grasp — his physical as well as his psychic nature — and controls all the movements of society, it is not only unwarranted by any evidence whatever, but illogical, to suppose that He has superseded it or given it a new force or direction. If we

cannot see in just what way it has evolved the æsthetic or ethical sense, neither can we see just how it has developed the sense of sight or hearing. We only infer that it has done so by comparing conditions known to have existed at long intervals. There is no question that, once evolved, these and all other senses and faculties are useful, and that they are developed and strengthened by use. The hand with its grasping power was not a ready-made device with which man was endowed, but was developed by the use of the tools and weapons which he handled. They in turn were developed in connection with the employment of the hand. The possession of reason and sagacity by man at the period when his social development began is assumed by Mr. Kidd as a reason for placing man's evolution in a class by itself; but reason and sagacity had their origin among animals far below man, and have developed with their use.

The view I have undertaken to present is that mentality, beyond that rudimentary form of it found in the lower orders, grew out of the necessity of supplementing a feeble physical power and inefficient natural weapons with cunning in man's competition with more powerful animals. The ethical sense grew out of the realized advantage of combination. But two men each intent on killing and devouring the other cannot combine. For this a basis of confidence is necessary. To disarm suspicion by a simulated kindness would, though the kindness were temporary, be an advantage, and this through repetition would by and by become instinctive. If not very deep, it would in time have pretty well defined areas of employment, and could, within these limits, be trusted.

Thus, without design or expectation, altruism would commence its mission in the world, destined in the end, by its utility, to overshadow all the advantages which could be gained from individual effort and to subordinate the selfish and self-interested desires.

I do not think that any other principle than utility, in a very wide sense, is necessary to explain this; but there is something in the application of it to which I wish to call a moment's attention. It is that utility itself is an ever-changing quantity, as it is, like everything, under the law of the survival of the fittest. The thing which to-day is useful may to-morrow be useless and an encumbrance. Our utilities are not usually foreseen, but are the result of something like accident. A principle thus revealed is wrought out by actual and repeated trials, and usually with many failures. Once fairly attained, if it is a utility, that with which it competes becomes an inutility. It is not enough that a device can secure something in itself useful: it must secure the most useful result attainable. The old process of steel making ceased to be useful with the discovery of the Bessemer process. The whole road of industrial progress is strewn with the wreckage of obsolete utilities. This, I believe, brings us pretty well into line with Mr. Kidd's doctrine of projected efficiency. What I have said about man living under artificial conditions and making his own environment is quite in harmony with it, if not identical.

On the other hand, a thing useful to high intelligence is worthless or a danger to a less disciplined or experienced mind. An automobile or a can of nitroglycerin

would be anything but useful to an Andaman islander. The understanding of its use is as necessary as its capacity to perform a certain work or function. Thus we may see that from the inception of the simplest form of life up to its highest there has been struggle and reaction, — life upon its environment and environment upon life. With man, not quite for the first time, but in a practical and large sense, there began an era of partially artificial environment, which nevertheless gave its reaction to his struggle just as the natural one had. Man ceased to compete to a great extent with the lower animals and began to compete with himself. There is no danger of deterioration for lack of opportunity for struggle. On the contrary, this seems to grow more desperate from generation to generation.

Nor does it appear that the law of the survival of the fittest has been suspended, as applied to the physical organism, in the artificial environment of society, as has been sometimes thought. The physical perfection of individuals, destined to become the natural leaders of the group in trials of pure physical strength and agility, is no longer necessary, and the process has perhaps ceased, though this is not very clear; but that the whole group is more efficient in this sense seems to be shown by the lengthened period of life. Mere strength has not always been a utility, even under the conditions of purely animal life. The cave bear and lion, the mammoth, great saurians, and fishes have perished, their very size probably making it harder to supply themselves with food. The competition which has gone on was not only between individuals but between species. This is why

the record of the rocks proclaims "a thousand types are gone." If man is to continue at the head of creation, it will be through eternal struggle and adaptation to his environment, slowly changing by his own efforts, purposive and undesigned. Whether in the future of life upon the earth he shall be "sealed within the iron hills," and a nobler type succeed him, we are in no position to say. There is nothing now to suggest it, nor is it a matter of practical concern. But the changes of that future, if it shall in any way compare with the measureless past, where the horologue of time ticked off the eons, we cannot dimly conjecture.

II

THE ETHICS OF HEROISM

A hero, as defined by Worcester, is "a man distinguished for valor, or for war-like achievements, a great warrior, a brave man." The bravery contemplated is animal daring exerted in the sphere of physical conflict; it is brute courage employed in the destruction of life or property, whether for purpose of defense or plunder. From the beginnings of the race this kind of courage has been held in extraordinary esteem. In the progress of mankind other qualities have come in for a qualified admiration, but this quality in all times, among all races, tribes, and nations, has called for the instinctive and vociferous applause of men. Not those who add to the comfort, safety, and well-being of others, but they who inflict pain, injury, wounds, and death are the envy of men and the idols of women. The Homeric tale of Venus deserting her skillful and ingenious spouse for the red-handed Mars is fairly typical. Though like courage and endurance be required, he is no hero who merely constructs, but he who destroys. He may, indeed, be the defender of his tribe or clan, or its leader against a neighboring tribe, but even if successful, that alone brings but a qualified approbation. That which appeals to his fellows is the spectacular bravery which seeks opportunities to display itself, delights in fighting for the demonstration

of superiority, and in taking life and shedding blood as a dexterity. To complete the heroic ideal, he must bear his own life lightly and yield it up gayly where the chances go against him or his adversary proves to be the greater hero.

Here, indeed, is the fatal infirmity of the glory of combat. Every hero is doomed, sooner or later, through failing powers or uncontrollable circumstances, to defeat. The suitors in the Odyssey, brutal, repellent as they are, boastful, swaggering, cruel to the weak, were nevertheless heroes according to the definition, and fairly entitled to their high-sounding epithets. It is not for their cruelty or barbarity, for lack of skill or courage, that the poet holds them up for our disapprobation. It is merely that they had trespassed on the preserves of a still greater hero. Ulysses was no whit less savage or cruel, but he was stronger and more skillful in taking life.

Goliath was to the Israelites a savage monstrosity, but an unparalleled hero to the Philistines until his glory was appropriated by the shepherd lad. There were heroes of this type in David's bodyguard also. Chancing to hear their leader sigh for a drink of water from a certain spring, they broke through the Philistine lines to obtain it. David, however, had other qualities than daring, and had no mind to sacrifice his valuable material in any such feather-headed enterprise, and he turned the water on the ground in token of his disapproval of it. The story of the cavalier who sprang into the arena among the lions to rescue the glove of his lady is in point. The grain of sense which, in fact, he showed was in throwing the glove in her face. But while in history, romance,

song, and folklore the hero has always been glorified, it is among the Norsemen that the apotheosis of courage has been attained. No higher ideal of happiness or reward in the future life was found than that their heroes should hack each other to pieces every day, to be restored again at night, that this grim joy might go on forever.

There is, however, another element in the heroic ideal, or at least in the popular conception of the hero. The man who is slain may be just as brave as his adversary, and only less skillful, but scant admiration is wasted on him. To win unstinted applause one must succeed. The hero is such only while he is victorious. Success does as a rule carry with it the idea of physical perfection. In primitive times, when the combat was determined solely by force, the hero must needs be the stronger man. If stratagem, surprise, concealment, or duplicity were factors, he must also excel in these; if skill in the use of arms, that, too, must be superadded. Finally, mysterious virtues in the weapons themselves became an element in the conception. Supernatural aid seems only to heighten the admiration for the one who thus overcomes his adversary. The gods come to the rescue of the heroes in the Iliad, and David had the assistance of the all-powerful Jahveh. Durandal, the sword of Roland, possessed supernatural qualities in itself, and was first given to Charlemagne by an angel. When men came to fight on horseback their steeds shared semi-divine honors with them. In brief, as the facilities for taking life increased, it was necessary for the hero to be equipped with all the latest improvements. In the fine art of

slaughter he must needs excel in his person, his characteristics, and his arms. Though bravery was a chief means of accomplishment, it was success that won applause, and it did not much matter how the factors contributing to it were proportioned to each other. It was a practical end or utility which was sought. It was merely a case of the survival of the fittest. The hero was the one who was better fitted than his opponents to resist the influences from without tending to the destruction of life.

But while physical courage has been the most applauded of human qualities, it has been the most common, I may say redundant. All men have not been heroes, because all cannot successfully compete with their fellows. Almost all men have desired to be, and have failed not for lack of courage but from the limitations of their physical organism. Only one in a group can stand at the head; but never does a leader fall but plenty of his followers press eagerly forward to contend for the dangerous honor of taking his place. Never was a hope so forlorn that more men than enough have not dedicated their lives to the slender chance of its success. Lord Roberts gives a picturesque illustration where, at the relief of Lucknow, the guns had made a breach in a wall just large enough for a man to squeeze through. Scores of men raced for the opening, each one knowing perfectly that the winner would be shot dead as he passed through.

But in this form of courage the civilized man is not superior to the savage. He is probably decidedly inferior, but, because of his greater knowledge of the forces of

nature, he is a far more formidable instrumentality for the destruction of life and property. Nor does man in any stage of culture possess this courage in a higher degree than the brutes. The reverse is the case; and, indeed, the lower we descend in the scale, the more completely all moral considerations, all perceptions of consequence are eliminated, the more absolute, uncompromising, and inflexible it becomes. To this there are apparent exceptions, but these admit of easy explanations. The animals to whom we attribute gentleness and timidity, in a state of nature, will be found unprovided with the means of contending with the more savage and so-called courageous beasts on anything like equal terms. These will usually be found to have developed qualities which are an admirable substitute,— fleetness of foot or wing to enable them to escape pursuit, superior cunning, means of concealment or of occupying positions out of the reach of their antagonists. But even among these, displays of the most absolute daring are not at all rare. The wren, we are told on excellent authority, will "peck at the estridge"; and we know that the humming-bird, that tiny bit of darting color, does not hesitate, under certain circumstances, to attack the lord of creation. Among the savage and cruel sorts the same principle may be observed. The wolf is accused of cowardice where he really uses judgment. He has the intelligence to measure the resources of his antagonist, and by himself will not attack a creature for which he is no match. But with his fellows he attacks the most formidable antagonist, and does not shrink from the wholesale destruction around him, nor from pains,

wounds, and death to himself. The lemming in his migrations stops at nothing; woe to the man or animal that stands in the way of the stream rolling on to the sea to lose itself in the waves. Even ants will attack large animals or men, and by their numbers overcome them. In their battles with other tribes they show the most incredible hardihood. They do not stop for the loss of legs and wings and the most frightful wounds. When the mandibles of another have severed the head of one of these warriors from his body he gives up the fight.

If, now, we observe the line of development, we shall see why physical courage was at its height among the lower orders. In these life fairly swarms, while the means for its maintenance, apart from other forms of life, are wanting. We have, therefore, the alternative presented to the three men of Bristol city: "Us must eat we." All life, indeed, subsists upon life, but here there are no removes, no disguises. It is a direct and square contest between two individuals as to which can and will eat the other. Even if the weaker should escape for a time through flight or concealment, his necessities drive him to attack another. Ultimately the strong will be pitted against the strong.

The food supply was for a long time almost the sole question, and remained so long after the advent of man. It is only in very recent times that any demand arose for clothing or for shelter other than that which nature furnished ready made. For an immeasurable period the activities of the globe were directed to two objects only, — the getting of food on the one hand, and to escape

being converted into food on the other. Life was the stake, and to win was to use skillfully all the means provided and to fight to the bitter end. The will to sustain the pain, fatigue, uncertainty, and frightful alternatives must be supported by what we may call absolute physical courage. Probably it was entirely indifferent to danger because wholly unconscious of it. It shrank at no consequence because it perceived none. Combat was a mere commonplace, a function. Some mentality there must have been from the start, but no suggestion of a moral sense. To kill another for food was just as much a matter of course as it is for the housewife to cook the oatmeal for breakfast. Perhaps it should not be called courage, as there is nothing in the nature of man exactly corresponding to it. But it cannot be denied that it is the raw material out of which physical courage in man has been evolved. It adapted itself to existing conditions, as it has in man. It is true, too, that in proportion as courage in man has approached this pure and unqualified animal daring, — the instinctive response to appetite, — it has gained the greatest respect and applause.

Without attempting to follow the steps of its development, let us come to a much later period, where we find it divided broadly into two classes, — the carnivora and herbivora among mammals, — with a like distinction among birds, insects, and other creatures. The flesh eaters retain their ferocity almost in its primal vigor, but modified by experience and adapted to the changed conditions. Almost their sole mission in life is to seize and devour the vegetable eaters. The mechanism which fits them for this at the same time provides them a formidable defense

against attack. They do not, therefore, prey on each other, as a rule,—though they fight for other reasons,—and in general beyond the family we do not find them organized either for attack or defense.

The herbivora also subsist upon life, but in a form which probably experiences no pain, and which cannot escape, and offers no active resistance. The mechanism which enables them to secure and masticate their food is nearly useless for defense. They must, therefore, avoid attack through the keenness of their senses, by concealment, by simulation, by swiftness of motion, and by endurance. Some of them have developed somewhat formidable weapons, but in general inadequate for individual defense against the carnivora.

It would be, perhaps, a misuse of language to say that an animal shows its courage by running away and avoiding a fatal combat. Let us observe, nevertheless, that it has accomplished all that it could have done even by a successful combat. It could not eat or in any way make use of its antagonist. It is altogether a question of adapting means to ends. It is the old problem in a different form. Strength, cutting and tearing teeth, beak, claws, talons, compete with swift wing and foot, with concealment, alertness, and position of advantage. For these defenseless creatures to engage in voluntary combat with their pursuers would show complete misconception as to their powers or complete indifference to safety. It would be to act without motive, there being no conceivable object to be gained. It would result in the swift destruction not only of their species, but also of those who prey upon them. From the biological point of view,

the action of the so-called timid creature is entitled to just as much admiration as that of the flesh eater. Both, doubtless, act upon instinct, developed by heredity through countless generations, until it is almost automatic and infallible. That the flesh eater is oftener the winner means only that his class is perpetuated where otherwise it would perish. It is simply in the order of things. The one who escapes by avoiding conflict does not show a higher intelligence than his adversary, but he shows no less. Each uses such means as he has for his own preservation, and neither probably has any pride or emotion beyond bare content with the end achieved. I do not suppose the deer brags because he has outrun the wolf, nor the lion when he has carried off a cow. It is a mere function.

Nevertheless, we find among these grass eaters a new principle coming in, destined at a later stage to be

> A lever to uplift the earth
> And roll it in another course.

It is not quite the beginning of the principle of combination, but it is the beginning of society as distinguished from the family. The power of organization and associated effort is brought into the problem of life. In some cases, as with the buffalo, this is fairly adequate against all foes but man. Where no active resistance can be put forth, the security is greatly increased by having many individuals on the watch against a common danger; and this was brought to a still higher degree of efficiency by having certain animals posted as sentries while the others fed or slept.

Following this organization for purpose of defense, probably, — though they may have been contemporaneous or even antecedent, — we find a few cases of combination for offensive purposes, as with the jackals, the wolves, and the dogs. These are individually weak as against some of the creatures on which they must depend for food. Possibly this is necessary for protection against still more powerful flesh eaters. There is no traceable moral element and no regard for consequences. There is no sympathy with the victim and no hatred. There is ferocity and implacability; but this is a part of the game. It is a question of getting a meal with the smallest cost in fatigue and pain. We do, indeed, see among the cats a sort of sardonic humor, perhaps delight, in the sufferings of their victims, manifesting itself as play.

Now, in the organization we have noticed in both these classes, some sort of leadership is a necessity. The individual that has shown the greatest capacity for offense or defense becomes the leader. The qualification is determined by actual trial, in contest with his possible rivals. If he is not glorified as a hero, it is because the feeling of admiration is still undeveloped. At any rate, he gets all he could possibly ask, and all that his community has to bestow. In the contests which have settled his right to the leadership he has displayed just as much courage as the lion and tiger in theirs.

When man appeared on the earth, we may say with confidence, he did not differ much from his near relatives. He had the instinct of the herbivora for combination for the purpose of defense, and of the wolf and jackal for attack. He united the characteristics of both classes,

his food also coming from both. In the beginning he was in the main a flesh eater, but in course of time his food came more and more to consist of grains, vegetables, and nuts. The procurement of food, at the outset, constituted almost his sole employment. His contests with the great carnivora were waged with a double purpose, not only to avoid being eaten, but to add to his own food supply. With his unaided physical powers, hands and feet without claws, teeth unfitted for seizing and tearing, he was a feeble creature as compared with the cave bear and lion. Under these conditions his intelligence showed him the utility of combination. Altruism had no part in it, probably, this being no more than germinal in his organization. There was scarcely a glimmer of moral sense. There was no individual right of property, no sympathy with suffering, no remorse for wrongdoing, as there was no sense of right and wrong; no idea of a superior power approving or condemning an act, no foresight, no dread of future retribution. His tools or weapons were such things as he could grasp with his hands, — stones or clubs. It was an absolute necessity that his group act in concert. After a while he learned how to fashion rude cutting and thrusting implements, knives, hatchets, spears of wood charred and hardened or tipped with bone or stone, and, later still, arrows. With his power to grasp, wield, and hurl these primitive weapons, his cunning and combined effort, he often overcame his most formidable antagonist, as evidenced by the bones remaining in the caves where he dwelt. There was great courage as well as skill in the use of his limited equipment, while in a great proportion of his contests he lost his life.

Into the leadership of this primitive community — the term "drove" would almost equally well designate it — the best man, after proving his title to that distinction by contests with his fellows, was inducted. The reward was the respect of the males and the admiration of the females. Three factors enter into the fitness of this man for leadership, — a high degree of physical perfection to insure the requisite strength, agility, and endurance, a high degree of animal daring, and skill in employing the resources at his command. These are all directed to strictly utilitarian ends. There is not yet any moral quality and, apart from their adaptation to desirable ends, nothing to admire. His courage is not different from that of any other animal, and because no longer the only or even chief means of accomplishing his ends, it must be less absolute than among the lower animals. The usefulness of the physical organism which fits him for the work he has to accomplish makes it to our eyes the standard of physical beauty; but whether it would be so to a mind entirely outside and uninfluenced by this consideration we cannot say. Every race, in fact, adheres to its own standards, and the monstrosities of the one are the adornments and ideals of another. The hippopotamus, we must suppose, is as beautiful to his kind as man to his. Except for his usefulness, there is no reason to think the hero was agreeable, or that he was held in any high esteem. On his part there is no generosity, no devotion to the common good, except as this contributed to his own safety or gratification. All in all, we must conclude that heroes were a disagreeable necessity and, by our standards, gratuitously and abnormally offensive.

From the first we may suppose that men made some small provision for their future wants, as even the dog accumulates his heap of bones, the squirrel his store of nuts, and bees and ants their treasures. Man went a step farther. He discovered that certain animals could be domesticated and so preserved for an indefinite time for some future need, and that grains and vegetables could be multiplied by cultivation. But when he had thus begun these small accumulations one group of men immediately became an object of envy to another. Man has no more relish for persistent application than any other animal. Labor under all conditions is irksome, and under those then prevailing must have been well-nigh intolerable. Men preferred the stress and danger of battle with the chance of wounds and death to protracted and inglorious toil. No right in property was yet recognized. It was entirely legitimate for another group of men to possess themselves of these stores if they could. Those who had accumulated them might hold them if they could. The group thus became the new unit, and contests were between the latter rather than between individuals, as in the earlier times. The strong appropriated the weak, feeding upon them literally as well as figuratively.

It is not necessary to my purpose to trace the industrial history of man, or the development of what we call moral ideas, one of the first of these being probably the recognition of the right of property, individual and communal. Somewhere in their progress men came to realize that it cost less to produce what they needed than to take it from their neighbors. They were, indeed, quite

ready for the latter whenever a specially tempting opportunity presented itself; but more and more they tended to some systematic industry as a regular and sure dependence. With the increase of experience and knowledge of the resources of nature, production has called for a constantly diminishing expenditure of fatigue and toil. The communities, on the other hand, have grown larger, partly through natural increase and partly through fusion of the groups. Just as individuals found security against a stronger individual by combination, so a small group found it against a larger one by combining with a third. At last we find great nations, occupying great territories and developing their resources. War has become a much more serious matter, and cannot be entered upon without long preparation and at vast expense, so great that the winner is still a loser. Meantime the idea of personal and property rights has been growing, and the rights themselves have been well defined. Following, but far behind these, as we should expect, comes the recognition of the rights of the communities among each other. Treaties, compacts, alliances, understandings of various kinds are entered into,—from selfish or prudential motives in the beginning, it may be conceded, but these finally become the basis of international law. Primarily this was to the advantage of the weaker state, but it eventually became equally advantageous to the stronger, as it furnished a standard of conduct and a basis for the settlement of disputes more economical than war. Meantime the principle of altruism, which in some incipient form existed far down in the scale of life, has been developing, until at last it is very active and far-reaching.

The weak and unfortunate are no longer eaten, but transferred to hospitals, asylums, and almshouses, and supported at the common expense. Wars are dreadfully oppressive and burdensome financially, but are waged at an ever-lessening destruction of life. They are not carried on in the old spirit at all. The wounded are not put to death, but treated by antiseptics and cared for as tenderly as the circumstances will permit. Captives are not reduced to servitude. Instead of wasting provinces, destroying cities and sowing them with salt, private property is protected, at least in theory, and the public property preserved, especially the things which pertain to the higher civilization, such as libraries, schools, museums, hospitals, and art collections. Infants do not have their heads dashed against walls, nor are they tossed in sport from spear-point to spear-point, as in the old "strenuous" days so beloved and mourned by some of our latter-day statesmen. Women are not outraged. Shops are not looted, but stand open, the merchants calmly dispensing their wares to the victors at extravagant prices. Consider the significance of a general, after a battle, borrowing ambulances of his enemy, as was done in the South African War. And now, at the end of nineteen centuries of Christianity, we have seen the most remarkable proposition in the history of the race put forth, not by some feeble nation, trembling before the threat of annihilation by a stronger, but by the most powerful ruler in the world, to form a tribunal in which all international disputes and misunderstandings shall be determined upon principles of right and equity, — in brief, that the golden rule be recognized by nations as

well as individuals. This proposition, thus put forth, we have seen welcomed and favorably acted upon by the nations.

Now, let us observe in outline the development of life from its emergence to its highest manifestation. First, the condition where each individual was in active antagonism to every other, and where the victor became the sepulcher of the vanquished; there was no composition and no alternative. Second, an element of intelligence which forecast the chances of success, — prudence or cowardice, if we so choose to designate it, — taking the direction of concealment, flight, or avoidance of the presence of the stronger, — cunning or strategy. Third, the organization of the weaker creatures against a stronger, for mutual defense. Fourth, organization for purposes of more efficient or economical production, in which we may include combinations like those of the wolves and dogs to capture game too powerful or too fleet for a single individual. Fifth, organization of the weaker communities against a stronger. Sixth, the coalescence of all communities into one large one for the regulation of national conduct, these large communities commonly determined as to their limits by some physical features, as mountains, deserts, or bodies of water, separating them more or less from other nations. Seventh, intercourse and trade relations between nations, and a code of rules recognizing and enforcing the rights of each.

Throughout this life history of the world physical courage has survived, but at each step it has undergone modification, and it has lost in importance. At a very early stage cunning and skill were as indispensable as

mere daring. Neither of them in the beginning had any distinctive moral quality. Even in the heroic age, as sung by Homer, Ulysses received as much praise for his "much planning" as for his strength and daring. During that immensely long period, then, when the life of the world was dependent upon what may be called the natural supply and was unable to exploit the resources of the world or to multiply or add to the existing products, an immense value was set upon physical courage as a condition precedent to living at all. The conduct of man as well as the actions of the lower animals was determined by a rigorous necessity. But when it began to dawn upon man that the resources of nature are practically unlimited, and all we have to do is to help ourselves, other qualities became greatly more important than courage. Observation, invention, sagacity, judgment, self-control, patience, persistence became the all-important factors. While the food question was still very pressing, the supply came through the industry of man instead of through the destruction of wild animals or other men. Regular, if primitive industries, arose, and rude commerce in the form of barter was found easier and more economical of pain and labor than the old distribution through combat and plunder. Foresight, caution, shrewdness, and endurance superseded the furious spasms of destructive courage which, as the great utility, had been the one thing to call for admiration. The humanities came into play. Literature, — at first as folklore, — music, art, architecture, began to occupy the thoughts of men. The superfluities of one age became the necessities of the next, the one beginning where the other

left off. But while the food supply will always be important, since life cannot be long maintained upon an empty stomach, the channels of supply are now so regular and definite, the deficiencies of one region so easily supplied by the surplus of another, the provision for the weak and unfortunate so abundant, that the question is no longer even perplexing, and physical courage in the form of its earlier manifestation hardly enters into the problem at all. Wars are no longer undertaken through any necessity, but through jealousies, misunderstandings, differences in political and religious opinions and ideas of honor. Last of all, we see nations going to war out of a sentiment which they persuade themselves is sheer humanity. Yet, strange to say, the sentiment which has driven a nation to war shrinks from the consequences entailed. Most of us will remember the hysterical shriek that went up from one end of the country to the other when Ensign Bagley and four other men were killed, the first victims on our side of a war which we had so lightly undertaken in the name of humanity. That it meant killing men on the other side we knew, but these had no right to live. It was a kind of Sunday-school work in which we were engaged, in which God was, as a matter of course, on our side. But the killing of our own men — we had not dreamed of anything so horrible. How are we to account for this feeling? Simply that, alongside of vast unreason, selfishness, and prejudice, the altruistic spirit fairly dominates the world. If it does not extend to all, it extends, at least, to those nearest us and those to whom our attention is directed. It is shown in thousands of ways in civil life, and notably

in the sympathy for those who have committed monstrous crimes.

In order to see how insignificant a factor this old form of physical courage has become in modern life, we need only to compare the condition of the United States with the conditions existing in its territory at the time of the discovery of America. Even then the native races had traveled as far from the cave dwellers as we have from them. The population, about all that could be maintained, did not reach five per cent of ours. There was considerable industry and some commerce, but production in proportion to the effort put forth was very small. Nearly all the requisites of life, food, clothing, and shelter, were derived from the chase. With us, fishing excepted, this is too small to be reckoned. With the Indian, every male, from a very early age, was a warrior. With us, for a whole generation, one fourth of one per cent of the males between eighteen and forty-five years of age were sufficient for this function. The Indians sometimes had a surfeit of food, followed by enforced abstinence and great suffering. The poorest among us enjoy a higher degree of average comfort than the aborigines under the most favorable circumstances. There is no reason to doubt that our population can be multiplied tenfold with a still higher average of comfort than now. If we consider the richness and complexity of modern life, its intellectual, religious, and social development, we can hardly fail to see that the old destructive courage is nearly eliminated except as a mischief-maker. The old-fashioned strenuous life is chiefly a concern to the police. Nine times out of ten an unusual display of

physical courage lands the hero of it in jail. How, then, is it that it continues to hold so high a place in the popular estimate, so absurdly outweighing its real utility, calling for admiration and applause a hundred times its due? If we consider attentively the phenomena of life development, we shall observe three distinct stages: first, the stage of simple brute courage; second, that in which mind, chiefly as cunning, formed a large element, finally outweighing entirely the brute courage; third, that in which a moral sentiment has been a factor, finally becoming the one of chief importance. They were the age of individual antagonism, of communal antagonism, and of combination. No hard-and-fast line divides them, but they shade into each other. Each has been a great utility in turn. With the dawn of intelligence, physical courage did not disappear nor become unnecessary, but it was modified to suit other methods and aims. With the growth of the moral sentiment the mental element was not diminished in importance, but it took a new direction. For the development of modern life, that confidence which is the basis of all associated effort and which is possible only under well-defined moral ideas is an absolute necessity. But in each stage the attitude and habit established in the preceding lingers long after its use has disappeared and it has become an obstacle to further progress. In every age and in every man there remains an inheritance of the past, — in habits, customs, language, opinions, beliefs, a vast residuum of the outworn and inept. In each stage of development life has adapted itself to its circumstances as well as it could. These three characteristics are to be considered

as agencies, pure and simple, in the process of adaptation. Physical courage is immensely older than cunning or strategy, and is more firmly established. Mentality is older than the moral sentiment, which is the least stable of all, though it is the indispensable factor in social life.

Now, the hero worship of which I speak is admiration for physical courage exerted skillfully, that is cunningly, for the purpose of overcoming an opposing physical force. Admiration is a quality which has perhaps undergone just as much transformation as courage itself, but in some crude form we must suppose that it was awakened in the beginnings of life at the display of animal daring, the one supreme necessity to existence. Admiration for skill, strategy, and cunning was awakened when these, too, were a necessary supplement to physical courage. Now, if we will observe primitive races, we shall find an immense degree of admiration attached to cunning in its lower forms. To accomplish an end by lying or stealing is not merely permissible, but calls for vastly more admiration than to accomplish the same end by what we should call legitimate methods. With ourselves it is still held that all things are fair in war and almost everything in politics. Even those whom we regard as enlightened statesmen do not hesitate, where an advantage is to be gained, wholly to misrepresent the position of an opponent.

These lingering characteristics and habits of a lower phase of life we call survivals. They are not peculiar to man, but exist in all life. We need only to go to our flocks and herds to find them in full vigor, where it is

very clear that they are no longer useful, but the contrary. These creatures under domestication are provided for, selfishly of course, by man, and secured from nearly all dangers to which they were exposed in their wild state, except danger from man himself, against which the surviving habits or characteristics are of no avail.

Observe, now, the admiration which the hens in a barnyard pay to the ruling lord. If the young cocks do not love him, they treat him with due deference and simulate a profound respect for his authority. But by and by a stranger appears, or a young cock growing up comes to recognize his own strength and "heroic soul." A fight ensues, and the leader is vanquished. It is a battle royal, stubborn and protracted. So far as their means extend, the combatants are as ferocious as birds of prey. They do not yield at a few scratches, nor flinch from frightful wounds. Torn, bedraggled, bleeding, the sometime master hurls himself, a fiery billet, upon his foe, striking with beak and claw until utter physical exhaustion paralyzes any further effort, when he slinks away, overwhelmed with mortification, to die, perhaps, in a corner. Do his devoted admirers go to him to soothe his griefs or comfort him in his pain? Not at all. They do not wait for him to get out of sight before transferring their allegiance to the new lord paramount. Perhaps they feel no contempt for the deposed ruler. It is all a mere matter of course.

Now, if we account for hero worship among our domestic animals as a survival long after the hero himself has ceased to subserve any useful end, how shall we account for similar phenomena among ourselves? How

do we explain the sudden dethroning of a popular idol who commits an act of questionable taste? Has it come to the point with us that good taste is more desirable than heroism?

So far I have dwelt upon that form of physical courage which enters into the definition of heroism, that is, the courage which incites to combat, offensive or defensive, with one's fellows. There is a form of courage much harder to maintain because unattended by excitement and unstimulated by applause. Many of the occupations of modern life are extremely dangerous, and but for coolness and caution, qualities which have nothing to do with courage, they would be far more dangerous than they are now. We do not think of a man as a hero because he is engaged in driving a wagon loaded with nitroglycerin, or in shooting oil wells, or working in a powder mill. To the spectator a man on the top of a ten- or twenty-story steel framework seems to be in imminent danger, but with the workman it is entirely a matter of experience and training. He knows perfectly the danger of any forgetfulness or want of caution; but he does not mean to forget. Because of his caution the chance of falling from a twenty-story building is much less than from a ten-foot scaffold; but the consequences of the latter might be less serious. So in the manipulation of any of the giant forces of the universe, but for his vigilance and prudence man would be crushed as a moth. In all the occupations classed as hazardous and extra-hazardous, while courage is necessary, the old impulsive, uncalculating, combative sort not only has no place but would constitute a chief danger. Even in war it now plays a very

subordinate part. The battle belongs not to the brave but to the skillful employment of the tremendous enginery of modern warfare. No one can doubt that the Spaniards in our late war were as brave as our own men.

There are a few cases where we accord a measure of applause to courageous deeds in civil life, but never with quite the zeal and enthusiasm with which we accord it to the military hero. For a Jim Bludsoe, who holds the nose of a boat against the bank until the passengers escape, himself going down in the blazing ruin, we can spare a little admiration, as also to the fireman who with scaling ladder climbs the lofty wall to save a life. It is a languid approval in comparison with the enthusiastic applause we should lavish upon an action calling for lesser fortitude, made in conflict with the intent to take life. Such as it is, it is a late development, growing out of the altruistic spirit, and in the old strenuous days would have been looked upon as evidence of weakness or a disordered mind.

But while in the popular mind the old hero worship holds its place with wonderful persistence, there are many things to indicate that it is growing confused and no longer infallibly follows the old ideals. The stoker in the hold of a battleship runs as much risk as the admiral on the deck, and his services are an indispensable factor in the result achieved. The men in the ranks run vastly greater risks than the general in the rear, who plans the whole movement of battle. It is not an essential, therefore, that the hero exhibit great personal daring or prowess; so that even now a higher value is set upon intelligence than upon mere physical courage. It ought

to be an easy step to the appreciation of that intelligence which is directed to altogether useful and beneficent ends, such as its relative importance demands.

From what has been said it ought to be clear that heroism as embodied in the traditional sense and popular ideal is already archaic. The unreasoning, instinctive, brute courage, ready to fight without cause and without caution, is no longer a useful quality. Even in war it has lost its value. What is wanted now is coolness, endurance, patience, steadiness. There is little field for the old spectacular fighting of man against man. Skill in the use of weapons of precision at long range, concerted movements, knowledge of the topography of a country, quickness in seizing the points of advantage, the adoption of the best means of concealment, not only of intended movements but of the individual combatants, the taking advantage of cover, all these things fall within what we have noted as the second development of life, prudence, mentality, and cunning, — a form of what men once called cowardice. The South African War served to demonstrate the futility of courage alone. To rush men across a fire-swept zone against a protected enemy is now seen to be mere madness and self-destroying folly.

Finally, we shall make a great mistake if we allow ourselves to undervalue physical courage. It will always be a necessity in the life of man. Situations will always arise where men must face danger, taking their lives, as it were, in their hands; but the application of courage in the old methods and to the old ends is becoming year by year obsolete. Reason is taking the place of a blind appetency, and science is superseding brute force. The

best man now is not the strongest, nor even the one most skillful in wielding destructive weapons. What we call moral courage has become a great factor even in war; but its uses in peace are a thousandfold more important.

There are those who sigh over the changed conditions and insist that the old rugged strength and stout heart were better than the intelligent but relatively weak man of our day. They gibe at the complexity and refinements of modern life as needless burdens and insist that conditions are not on the whole improved. It is not necessary to argue the point. Many insist that life is not worth the living in any case. The troglodyte, mumbling over the raw bones of the aurochs, never stopped to discuss this matter; and no pessimist would argue the desirability of going back to cave dwelling. Perhaps life never was worth living; but it certainly was the less so the farther we go back in the story of the human race. Some centuries hence it may be worth a great deal more than now. There may be a fourth stage of development, upon which we have already made a small advance. Reason, in a larger sense, a truer and wider perception of the relations of things, a better understanding of the utilities and capacities of nature, will take possession of man, and will receive that admiration which has in turn been bestowed upon physical courage, cunning, and moral virtues. The coming man will be brave, but his bravery will be directed to wholly different objects and aims. He will bear pain better than now. He will be calm in the presence of danger, and accept death, when it comes, without fear or repining, as a part of the order of nature,

a part of his environment against which it would be idle to contend, and as subserving higher uses in the process of the development of the race, through the removal of that which has fulfilled its mission and has become obsolete.

III

THE ETHICS OF PATRIOTISM

Men differ upon almost every conceivable subject. They are vehement in their contention, on the one hand, that this political party or that is actuated by high and holy motives, and, on the other, that it is bent upon the ruin and degradation of the country. Theological disputes are acrimonious in the extreme; and men wax valiant in fight over questions of grammar. There are men, though not many to avow it, who doubt the propriety and binding force of each one of the ten commandments. But throughout all our borders probably we should find hardly a man who would hesitate an instant to say that patriotism is a duty. If asked "What is patriotism?" the very babes and sucklings would answer, "It is the love of country." Those who are a little past the suckling period would doubtless add, "and devotion to its interests." I make no objection to the definition and do not know that I can give a better; but I desire to say that it is a pure abstraction. When we translate it into terms of action or feeling under concrete conditions, plenty of difficulties will arise. In what sense is it a duty to love one's country?

It is the land of my birth, where I have always lived. My friends, my interests, my associations are all here. If I should go alone to a foreign land, for a short time,

whatever the desire or inducement, I should very likely be lonely and homesick. Every immigrant has doubtless had that feeling upon setting foot upon our shores, strongly as he might believe that his expatriation was to his advantage. Is this feeling patriotism? If so, is it American patriotism?

There may be other reasons for loving my country. It is a good place for the manufacture of steel rails, or tin plate, or buttons, or twine; and the government, grateful to me for building up a new industry, by its legislation raises the price of these products for my benefit. Conditions are favorable for carrying on a big wheat farm or a department store. I am an officer in the army or navy, an employé in the civil service, well supported at the public expense. There is freedom of speech, and I may abuse my neighbor as much as I like, if he is not a bigger man than I, or my language does not trench upon what is actionable at law. There is religious liberty, and I can go to any church, or stay away, as I like, and am exempt from tithes. These are excellent reasons for loving my country; but do they make me a patriot?

The last half of the definition will, upon examination, be found equally hazy and ambiguous. What, for example, does "devotion to its interests" require of me in a war like the late conflict in the Philippines? To pay my taxes, of course, and put stamps on my bank checks; even the publicans and sinners must do that. But what must I say, and how must I feel? Must I believe that it is a glorious war, born of the loftiest and most disinterested motives? Must I hold that wherever our flag has once

been raised it must remain? Do the interests of my country mean only or chiefly its material advantages? If so, must I limit myself to the immediate results, or shall I consider those which may be looked for in the future? Is the traditional love of freedom and justice to be taken into the account? What weight shall I allow to political ideals, to historic precedent, to the effect of war upon the public morals? What to the sudden blazing up of a military spirit, a recrudescence of the barbaric instincts, the increase, likely long to continue, of army and navy, with their burden of taxation? What to the growing disposition to interfere in the affairs of other nations?

I am not here discussing any of these questions in themselves, but merely showing that before the "best interests of our country" can be determined all these must receive their proper answer. The proposition which we had thought so self-evident is more complex than we supposed.

But quite oblivious to any of these limitations, the popular conception of patriotism, concretely stated, is simplicity itself. It is that it requires us, off and on, to hate all foreign governments, especially such as are called monarchies, and to pursue our own interests and ends with lordly indifference to the opinions and interests of mankind. It glories in the immensity of our population, our vast resources, and our assumed ability to thrash the united world. It relates, in fact, wholly to war, actual or prospective. It means admiration for the prowess of our arms, our ability to devastate and destroy;[1]

[1] One of our teachers told me that she asked one of her scholars what patriotism meant, and received the prompt information, "To kill

and while it may plume itself upon the magnitude of our industries and arts, it does not recognize the latter feeling as patriotism. Of the higher life of the nation, the connection of its thought with the thought of the world, its civilization as a part of the advance of the race, it takes no heed at all. If this is the view of the unthinking only, then it must be said that there are a vast number of people commonly rated as intelligent who do not think. It is the view of many of the really kind-hearted and conscientious, who would not for the world wrong a neighbor. It is the view of a great multitude who are influenced by commercial motives entirely, and who see in a state of war chances to improve their fortunes. To point out these would be an ungrateful and a useless task — but we all know some of them.

There is still another class who in a general way are opposed to war, who say in effect: "The nation can do no wrong." Being at war, no matter what it involves or how brought about, whether avoidable or not, whether its successful prosecution will or will not bring either honor or advantage, it is the part of patriotism to suppress their opinions, to wash their hands of any responsibility in the matter, to encourage the war spirit, and

Spaniards." Now that the teaching of patriotism is to be made compulsory in our schools, one may well tremble for the future of his country. That any ideas can be inculcated other than those current in our newspapers and, I am obliged to say, in the ordinary pulpit, is hardly to be hoped for. If there is anything of which we stand in crying need, it is an antidote to this. How the subject is to be taught properly and usefully is a matter for our best educators seriously to consider. The teacher with rational ideas on the subject and courage to utter them would in most of our communities suffer martyrdom.

shout with the crowd. For all practical purposes they might as well hold the popular view. Now, I concede that the good citizen cannot, under any easily imaginable circumstances, actively oppose his government, however he may believe it to be in the wrong. He cannot refuse his share of the burdens which war brings upon the nation, nor can he give aid and comfort to the enemy. But he is not under obligation to stultify himself or to conceal his convictions. It is precisely at such times as we are considering that temperate but earnest expression of opinion may aid in bringing about a healthier public sentiment. Those who really love their country ought to be willing to be placed with the minority, to bear obloquy and persecution, if necessary, in following what they believe to be for its best interests. To acquiesce in an unrighteous war, approving it in appearance and in word, with a mental reservation and a promise when it is over to do what they can to discourage future wars, is cowardice or imbecility.

If patriotism is a duty, — and under my conception of it I hold it to be so, — it must somehow be brought within the system of ethics. Its basis must not be sought in a sentiment, but in laws of right and wrong. It is not an isolated virtue, but a part of character. It is not a theory, but a question of conduct. "Love of country" cannot be satisfied by a froth of enthusiasm, the clapping of hands, the blubbering of vulgar sentimentality, nor even by enlistment in the army. "Devotion to its interests" will not be evidenced by the blind applause of every proposed action by the government, right or wrong, wise or foolish. It will be shown rather

by the patient effort to determine, first of all, what is the rational and proper action. If, unfortunately, a different one has been determined upon, it will endeavor, so far as possible, to make the error manifest and to urge another course. When the true one has been found, then it will be manifest by a willingness to make sacrifices and bear hardships, if need be, to accomplish the end sought. It will therefore involve the exercise of the soundest judgment and the coolest reason.

If this is the true conception of patriotism, then I am sure no one can have for it greater veneration than I. If I cannot approve everything which my country has done or attempted, I do profoundly honor the ideals which it set before itself in the beginning, and am distressed beyond measure whenever it seems in danger of losing them. I do not censure warmth of feeling, a glow of pride, over the achievements of our countrymen as such. Nay, there have been many occasions in my life when a glimpse of the Stars and Stripes has wrought in me an intense, sometimes, I must confess, a most irrational enthusiasm. The flag is a symbol of the government; but it is perfectly possible for it to stand for dishonor and wrong. Few now doubt that it did so when it stood for human slavery in our own land. Whatever it meant to me in the more emotional season of youth, it is now "Old Glory" only as it stands for glorious principles. If I am a good citizen, I cannot, in my relations to my fellow citizens, violate those principles of honor and morality upon which the good of the community depends. No more can a nation, without loss of character, without dishonor, without forfeiting its right to the esteem of

the world, violate the immutable laws of justice and righteousness upon which the welfare of the community of nations is based.

To say, therefore, as our newspapers have lately been saying, *ad nauseam*, that we are a young giant just becoming conscious of our strength, a great world power that will not brook dictation, is quite beside the question. It is precisely as if we should say that a young athlete is justifiable in using his strength against any one on the street who offends him or who chances to be in his way. To say that we will not heed the intelligence or moral sense of the world is to proclaim ourselves barbarians. Concede, if you please, that we have nothing to fear, that we are able to repel any force which may be brought against us, the question whether the best interests of the nation will be subserved by possible conflicts remains. Taking it in its lowest phase, will our industry and trade be best promoted by war or peace? Will it be a source of unqualified satisfaction to us, after the expenditure of enormous blood and treasure, to know that we have inflicted equal or greater loss? On the most selfish view, as well as on the most disinterested, our true course must be dictated by judgment and right reason. How is it possible that the great majority even of intelligent people have made patriotism practically synonymous with mere combativeness, one of the lower animal instincts? If we attentively observe the conditions under which this was developed, the purpose it has subserved in the advance of the race, the changes it has undergone, how it has adapted itself to circumstances, the matter will be simplified.

We have seen that in the lowest forms of life each individual organism was unassociated with every other. They were not entirely unrelated, since they had a common habitat and one life reacted upon another; but there was nothing in common. There was no sex. Life was multiplied by the mere division of an organism, each half becoming an individual life. There were no organs, no special appliances, no senses, a rudimentary sense of touch possibly excepted. The creature floated about in the water without apparent aim, but upon coming into contact with an object which could be assimilated, in some way, without mouth or digestive cavity, managed to envelope it with its own entire organism, which was a mere globule of jelly-like matter. The whole creature might be considered a rudimentary stomach, without and within. Thus the sundered halves might conceivably furnish food for each other. Not merely might the father eat the son, or the son the father, but the creature might devour itself. Life was, in brief, an organized appetite. For an immense period the only question in the world was of eating or being eaten, a hundred to one the latter, since one organism could be perfected only by the destruction of many others. The only relation which could subsist between the different individuals in this microscopic world was one of absolute antagonism; and courage or indifference to danger was the first condition of a prolonged existence. Possibly the suffering was not great. There may have been no consciousness of life, as we understand consciousness, and there was almost certainly no dread of death.[1]

[1] Haeckel thinks that consciousness proper is developed only in connection with the nervous system, having a common center; but this

As the history of life went on, special organs were developed, and contrivances by which the creature became more efficient both in the art of destruction and defense. Teeth, claws, horns, stings, fangs, increase of strength, speed, agility, greater skill in the use of its means, cunning in concealment or attack were developed; but evermore the contest as to which should be eaten went on.

Almost from the beginning, therefore, we find two great classes or divisions of animal life, — one subsisting on vegetable, and the other on animal life. We may guess that combination first arose among the former for the purpose of defense. Thus common resistance to attack or communal vigilance and cunning took the place of the exclusive, individual effort. This led, in some cases, as with the dog, the wolf, and the jackal, to combination for the purpose of destruction. In man combination for both purposes was probably effected from the beginning. Something of the kind existed, indeed, much lower down the scale of life, as with bees and ants, where we find highly organized communities, perhaps we might say civilization. I am not attempting to follow

appears to contradict his whole general theory of the progress of life. Wherever we see any effort at the adaptation of an organism to its environment, any attempt at self-preservation, we should postulate some sort of consciousness. In the lowest forms of life it is, no doubt, as vague as the life itself; but we do not have to go very high in the scale of life to find a vigorous manifestation of it. Every boy has noticed the energetic response of the earthworm to the stimulus of the point of a fishhook and the writhings of the creature when he has been successfully impaled. If not conscious suffering, what is it? Perhaps in these lower forms sensation and consciousness are the same thing.

the exact order of the development of species, but merely attempting to point out the general course of things.

With man, the family, consisting of a man, wife, or wives, and children, formed the primary group, which soon enlarged into the patriarchal family, then into larger communities, the clan, tribe, and race. In every stage a leader was a necessity; and we have seen how he was selected. All members of the group would be in some sense dedicated to the common interest, whether in offense or defense. But just as there were antagonisms between the individuals, there will now be between the groups, the accumulations of each becoming objects of desire to the other. In the contests that followed, the successful leader became the hero. This was in no way different, presumably, from the heroism shown by animal leaders, but was higher in intelligence. In the benefits of a successful contest each member of the community shared, and there would be a community of satisfaction. Each would have a vicarious pride in the common achievement, whether he had contributed much or little to it. Every male might legitimately aspire to the leadership, so that there would be a community of ambition.

Having now a developed communal feeling, we have to go but a step to find the beginnings of patriotism. At the outset the feeling of attachment to locality would be weak or entirely wanting. Men would go where they were most successful in securing fish and game, or where roots and berries, on which they depended in part, were most abundant. They would change their locality without the slightest hesitation or regret whenever a better

was found. But if the locality continued to furnish sufficient food, they would gradually accumulate tools and shelter, however rude, and the idea of ownership, communal so far as the land is concerned, would arise.

Now, the family, consisting of father, mother, and children; the patriarchal family, consisting of several primary families; the tribe, composed of several patriarchal families, recognizing each other as near kindred; the race, where the idea of kinship has mainly disappeared, but where a common origin is predicated, and where common traditions largely control the development, — all these may be called natural groups, growing out of or taking form in the law of descent. But as far back as we can go in history we find also the petty state, cutting across tribal and race lines, including more and less. We find also the nation, including several small states or kingdoms. These are quite artificial and based on considerations of utility or convenience only. The influence of leadership has no doubt had something to do with it, but it is quite safe to say that they could never have been formed if they had not proved to be useful. Just as the smaller groups were formed to eliminate individual antagonisms, so these larger bodies were formed to mitigate group antagonisms.

In the course of time the difficulties of changing the habitat became great or prohibitive. The inconvenience of transporting their personal belongings would forbid a general migration. If this were overcome, it would still be necessary to exterminate a similar population in the territory to which removal was proposed. But after a region is fairly settled and the cultivation of the soil

has come to be somewhat general, the work of one year would have some relation to the future and value beyond the immediate return. As civilization advances, therefore, people become not figuratively but literally *attached to the soil.* The interests of a people would be all connected with a certain region, which they called their country. Individuals move here and there, and leave a country altogether, but the body of the people is fixed. The borders of a state change through wars or purchase, but the population remains. The fortunes of the individual finally come to be dependent on the perpetuity and stability of the community, and he begins to have a sort of proprietary right in it. Whatever affects the whole affects him. He gives himself credit for the achievements of his neighbor, and finds comfort in shifting the responsibility for his own failures upon the community at large. All this time he may have no love for the land as such, and no love for the community of which he is a part, but a mere perception of the advantage which they afford him. A foreign land may appeal to his æsthetic sense more strongly; a foreign community may offer greater advantages to his business interests, his social instincts, his tastes. If he changes his habitat, in a short time the same sentiment attaches to the new community. To give up friends and break with lifelong associations is a loss for a season, but he follows the course which seems to him on the whole to offer the greatest advantage.

Patriotism, then, in its origin and development, has been utilitarian and economic rather than moral. It is simply the principle of combination and coöperation

applied to the aggregate interests of a community, small or large. In the end, of course, it embraces more than merely material ends, the moral and intellectual interests coming in for their dues. While by our definition we make it relate to a country, it is not, perhaps, to be distinguished from the sentiment which attaches to the primitive home, the rude platform in the branches of a tree, or the cave which furnished shelter and protection. There coöperation in the work necessary to support life, common use and ownership of the bits of shell, bone, or stone, — their first household implements, — union for defense, enjoyment in common of the fruits of their efforts, finally resulted in the family feeling as we know it. The sentiment attached itself, in turn, to each larger group, retaining as much as it could of what it had, but giving up something to each. Naturally the family tie is strongest of all because the earliest and having had the longest inheritance. Next would follow the attachment to home, the dwelling place and spot of ground owned or controlled by the householder. Then would come the tie to the neighborhood, including everything well known, but growing weaker with every step taken from the hearthstone. In England we should find it following an order something like this: the family, the village or tun, the hundred, the parish, the county, the petty state, the kingdom, the empire. Our political divisions are more artificial and pre-arranged. The order would run like this: the family, the school district, the township, the city, the county, the state, the United States. Chronologically or historically, we should find the tie first attaching to a little island in the James River or a strip of rocky soil on the

Massachusetts coast. Now, it must spread itself over half a continent. It does not need to be pointed out that it must be weakened by this great extension, for the reason that to the great mass of people the greater portion of our country must remain absolutely unknown, and it is impossible to have the same interest in that which is remote as in that near at hand. At the time of our separation from the mother country, the little plantations had grown into thirteen colonies. Now we have four times as many political groups. When we get through our conquests we may have a hundred. At the beginning of the Revolutionary War it never entered the heads of the colonists, for the most part, that patriotism required the people of one colony to love those of another, or to devote themselves to its interests. Self-interest alone suggested a union for common defense. Even up to the time of the Civil War the idea that people in the several states owed love or devotion to the interests of the United States had been but feebly developed at the South. Certain prescribed duties and burdens they recognized, but allegiance was due to the state.

Consider, now, another significant fact. The population of our country is made up of nearly all the races of the world, immigrants from all civilized nations, some half-civilized and many barbarous peoples, with their descendants. These all owed the duty of patriotism to the communities from which they came. There were the Indians, the original proprietors, hundreds of tribes, owing fealty to a little community and a limited territory. In Louisiana there was a Spanish patriotism to be changed into French and then into American. In

California it was Spanish, then Mexican, then American. In Alaska it was first Russian. Among the original colonies many nationalities were Americanized. There is said to be a little piece of land lying between Maine, New Hampshire, and Canada not included in any jurisdiction. Presumably there is a *de facto* government, and the poor people manage to get along some way with the patriotism which attaches to this No-man's land. But consider how sad it would be if, indulging the belief that they were really within the jurisdiction of Maine, they should allow their patriotic fervor to fix itself to that cold-water state, and a future survey or agreement should make it necessary to transfer it to the state of abounding rock and easy license; sadder yet, should they finally be set off to Canada, so to become a part of one of the effete monarchies of Europe! It would then be necessary for the people to learn "to love what now they hate, and hate what they adore." This is no empty speculation. Actual war once raged along the border line between New York and Vermont because the people did not know to which of these states their patriotism belonged.

Perhaps the most peculiar spectacle is presented by the attitude of our citizens of African descent, — dragged from a distant land to which their patriotism was due, held to unwilling service and unrequited toil, denied all political and nearly all legal rights, property, wife, children, home, bought and sold like cattle, subject to the will or caprice of a master, their very claim to humanity repudiated, so that the pride of ownership, which among others finally develops into the patriotic sentiment, was,

as it were, reversed and made to cherish a negation. It was the master's possession which they gloried in, and their pride increased in proportion to the number of people, themselves included, who had no rights at all. Beyond one or two of the neighboring plantations, the slave knew nothing whatever of his country, and his ideas of its glory were but a distorted reflection of those of his master, which may or may not have had a rational basis. His devotion to the interests of his country, measured by willingness to make sacrifices for it, would probably have been small; but in patriotism of the emotional sort, that sentimental haze and blind enthusiasm which works itself off in shouting, firing of guns, and grandiloquent oratory, he has had no equal.

From these illustrations it must be clear that patriotism, whatever it is, is not one of the absolute virtues, like truthfulness, honesty, or sobriety, but the most changeable, artificial, and relative which can well be imagined. It shifts with every action of a community, real or proposed. If that action is in accord with sound reason, if it is the best possible under the conditions, then the support and approval of the citizen is patriotic. If it is against sound reason, to the disadvantage of the country, or less advantageous than another course which is open, patriotism will require the citizen to disapprove and actively oppose it, even if it is necessary to stand alone or to make a majority only by counting God on his side. If the case is such that reason cannot authoritatively determine what the best interests of the country require, then citizens will take the one view or the other according to their conception of the probable

results, and their action will be equally patriotic, though opposed. Thus it would seem that, in a concrete case, the most important element in patriotism, devotion to the interests of one's country, would eliminate blind sentiment entirely and become identical with reason.

We have already seen how courage, in its inception a quality employed in combat, has steadily declined with the development of mentality, so that now it holds only a subordinate place even in war; that with the growth of the race it became even more widely applicable in the arts of peace. In the end it is left with very little of its primary character, and has been transmuted into coolness, prudence, restraint, and reason. In like manner patriotism found its first application in combat. War, if not the normal state, was the chronic condition among primitive races. The arts of peace, though from the first they must have been immensely more important than war, which produces absolutely nothing and is waged solely for the purpose of destruction, attracted little attention. At any rate, during this stage patriotism meant simply the desire for the success of the community in war. Love of country was joy in the success of its arms. But in process of time it became apparent to mankind that the real prosperity of a country depended almost altogether on its productive efforts, so that devotion to the interests of country took on an entirely different meaning. Under this meaning we may be permitted to rank as patriots all who are conscientiously carrying forward in their country the work of the world, inventors, artists, musicians, scientists, philosophers, scholars, teachers, workmen, — all who are doing

their best to fill their places in their country and the world, without fuss or complaint. All these are just as truly entitled to admiration and praise as the warrior who risks his life on the battlefield; certainly a great deal more than the man who goes into a war for what he expects to make out of his share of the plunder, even if we call it prize money.

Patriotism, then, on its intellectual side, is pretty much the same thing as right reason; on its moral side, nearly the equivalent of good citizenship. But if there is still a small field for the exercise of patriotism in the old sense, it ought not to escape our attention that even here its spirit has been profoundly modified, and in what we call a necessary war the temper and feeling of the citizen are not at all what they once were. It is the theory, once closely approached in practice, that where two communities are at war with each other, every individual of the one is at war with every individual of the other, and his duty requires him to strive to the uttermost for the destruction of his enemy. All ties of friendship, kindred, humanity, sympathy, community of thought were thus swept away. Patriotism required the Jews absolutely to destroy the cities of their enemies, not stopping with the slaughter of women, but wreaking vengeance on unborn babes. It was in supposed obedience to the divine command that Samuel, in cold blood, hewed Agag in pieces before the Lord. In the exercise of patriotism, such as they understood it to be, the American Indian inflicted upon his captive the extremity of pain. But for a long time the rigors of war have been abating. Even the soldiers feel little

personal enmity towards each other. Citizens are usually safe in person and property; and the conventions of civilized nations forbid the employment of certain destructive agencies in war. Thus in the field left to it the old patriotism is losing its ferocity, its delight in slaughter and destruction; and while men may take life in vainglory, they no longer often do it for pastime, although we still blush to remember the chronicle of the advent of the allied forces of "civilization" in China, with its frightful recrudescence of barbarism.

We have seen how groups, from families to states, tend to coalesce to form a larger unit. The primary end we have found to be the elimination of antagonisms. In the process one group is sometimes destroyed; sometimes it becomes a vassal to the stronger. The larger body sometimes goes to pieces, but the process of reuniting the fragments is immediately renewed. Thus far we have considered only integration brought about by conquest. We should miss the significance of this general movement if we failed to note the influence of even more potent factors. These did not manifest themselves to any considerable degree during the period of chronic war, but appeared immediately when peace became the normal condition. It then became evident that it was much easier for man to supply his wants through industry than through conquest. We shall accordingly see, in the development of industries of all sorts, an irresistible tendency in the direction of union or combination. The primitive family supplied its wants directly through its own efforts, conquest being one of them. Food, clothing, implements, and weapons were home made, a rude barter

coming in at an early stage, but no community of effort in production. Now, we shall find thousands of workmen collected in the great mills, weaving cotton, woolen, and silk, making shoes, clothing, tools, furniture, canned goods, and the myriad appliances of modern life. Even agriculture, the slowest of all industries to change, manifests the same tendency. As yet not a great deal has been done toward assimilating the industries of different countries, though the effect of the one upon the other is easily seen.

Trade or commerce is another agency, perhaps working still more powerfully to this end. In itself it pays not the slightest attention to race, creeds, political boundaries, or social distinctions. It is purely a question of buying and selling to advantage. Governments, for reasons which they deem sufficient, interfere by means of tariffs, restrictions, prohibitions, or monopolies; but trade itself knows none of these, and would, subject to the question of profit only, take the whole world into its field. These two great factors, it should be noted, are purely selfish or self-interested, working to economical ends without the slightest sentiment. It is true that there must be a large recognition of individual right and a large measure of rectitude and fair dealing, but even these are recognized as means to an end.

Upon this point it would be easy to enlarge; but it is not necessary to do more than point out the direction of things. The growth of trades unions and organizations by which it is intended to control labor is a striking instance. The department store, by which nearly everything wanted in a community is brought within a

single building and controlled by a single head, is another. The union of capital in the consolidation and management of railways and steamships is a movement on a great scale begun well within the memory of most of us.

Other factors making for the integration of mankind grow more important with advancing civilization. Art, music, literature, and science, for example, strive toward certain ideals and care nothing whatever for race and political separations. Difference in language and distance prevent to some extent the dissemination of ideas; but so they would do if all countries were united in one body politic. The acceptance of ideas is not a matter of nationality at all. Thought asks for no passport and stops at no frontier. While, therefore, we may admire the great achievements of our countrymen, our pride must be based upon the value of their work and not upon the fact that it is American. In the higher life of the world there is no room for patriotism in the accepted, vulgar sense.

I have left to the last the consideration which some will think sufficient to determine the whole matter. In what way is patriotism related to Christianity, meaning not ecclesiastical bodies or so-called Christian nations, but the teaching of Christ as to the social relations of men? Does this tend to the unification or to the separation of the race — to divide men into diverse, hostile, or at best indifferent groups, or to draw them together in common interest, effort, and feeling? I suppose that no one will hesitate an instant for the answer. Now, if Christianity is the basis of ethics, as most people believe, we shall find therein a solution of all questions of national as well

as of personal conduct. Whether this is or is not the real basis of ethics is immaterial. The belief that it is must determine largely the feeling which we are to exercise toward those of different nationality or race. It cannot be that my conduct as a man is to be determined upon the principles laid down by Jesus Christ, and my action as a citizen upon principles absolutely in conflict with them.

While it is true, therefore, that nominally Christian nations have waged the most cruel and inhuman wars, even in the name of Christ, that institutional Christianity has retained many of the antagonisms under which the race has groaned, and added yet others of its own, it is yet true that the central thought of the Master, never wholly lost or forgotten in the Church, the brotherhood of man, is the most powerful of all factors working for the unification and integration of humanity. If wars are waged by Christian nations, it is not because of the teachings of Christ, but in spite of them. If Christianity is really to become the universal religion, necessarily it must eliminate wars and all other antagonisms which originated in and were necessary to the lower forms of life, and which remain as a survival in the higher. The principle which it applies to conduct — do unto others as you would wish them to do unto you — is limited to no class, condition, or circumstances, but is universal, cutting across the lines of race, language, tradition, prejudice, political jurisdiction, religion, creed, and ceremonial. It is absolutely opposed to the local, the exclusive, the particular, and accidental. It aims to bring all mankind within the operation of a single law, to secure for every

human being the share that falls to him as one of the children of the universal Father; not such share as he can grasp and hold by the strong hand, but that freely and joyfully accorded him by every other person in recognition of a common brotherhood; not actual equality, perhaps, but equal opportunity, equity, fairness, generosity. In a community, in a world, where such a principle of action prevails, what place is left for patriotism in the offensive, popular sense of exclusive pride in our own country and devotion to its selfish interests? It is the principle of Christianity which I here consider, not its results as yet realized. Christianity has not yet had its last word. That it will at last bring the reason and conscience of mankind to the acceptance of the golden rule I sincerely believe. Men may or may not think it of supernatural origin. Because of what I conceive to be a gross misunderstanding or willful perversion of the Master's teaching I shall devote a special chapter to the consideration of the teachings of Christ with reference to war.

We have seen a steady progress of unification from the time when combination began to take the place of the old antagonisms. We have seen the smaller groups coalesce or become coördinated in a larger unit, until at last the nation is formed. We have seen the forces which are at work in this process. We have yet to observe that it does not end with the nation. It is not generally realized that the nations have been united for certain purposes. There is no organic union, but a large body of political and legal principles have secured just as complete recognition among all civilized nations as have the principles which regulate the rights of individuals

in the State. Rights, privileges, and duties are defined in what we call international law, — law not imposed by one nation upon another, but by each nation upon itself. The code is still very imperfect, and no means of enforcing it as yet exist except the compulsion of the moral sense of mankind, which each year grows more potent. It does not pretend to regulate the entire conduct of a nation toward its neighbors, any more than the municipal law pretends to cover the entire conduct of the citizen. Our own century has done more for the definition and recognition of its principles than all which had preceded it. The conference at The Hague did not result in all that was hoped for it, or which might have been secured under other conditions. We were unhappily engaged in a war of conquest; Great Britain was likewise handicapped by its South African difficulty; and Germany had wantonly seized a portion of Chinese territory and did not choose to defend itself in an international court. Nevertheless, the establishment of a court, though not compelling arbitration, is the most significant fact in nineteen centuries of international development. Excepting in the class of cases where the national honor is supposed to be involved, the propriety and righteousness of arbitration were fully recognized. With the ever-increasing pressure of moral sentiment, we may reasonably look forward to the settlement in the near future of all differences between nations upon fixed legal principles.

Suppose we go a step farther. Let us conceive that for certain large purposes, looking to the general utility, the governments of the civilized world should join themselves by actual union, their duties and relations being

defined by actual compact, any concrete case arising to be construed in an international court. There would thus be formed, for certain specified purposes, a republic of nations, the members bearing toward it much the same relation which our states bear to the general government. Such a confederation is not only not impossible, but not at all improbable. Nay, unless there is a change in the direction of the forces which during all these centuries have been setting more and more strongly one way, it is a certainty, though it would be rash to attempt to fix its advent.

He would have been a rash prophet, nay, a madman, who, two centuries ago, had predicted the union of half a hundred American communities in a single nation, and that without conquest. It is only a little more than a millennium since England consisted of seven separate and warring governments. How many there were in Ireland, Scotland, and Wales it would not be easy to say. The union of these in the Kingdom of Great Britain was not accomplished until the beginning of the nineteenth century, while the British Empire is a thing of our own generation. The same is true of the German Empire. Conquest, it is true, has been an element in this process, but that which has lain behind it all is a clear perception of the utility of such a union. To suppose that the process has now stopped would be preposterous. That the great nations will sometime be brought together in voluntary and indissoluble bonds is as sure to my mind as that "God is in his heaven."

What, then, will patriotism demand at our hands? Our hands, I say, meaning those who shall follow us. We of this generation may hope to see this only in vision, but

even now it is our right to claim, through our efforts, citizenship in that social New Jerusalem, the pattern of which is already prepared in the heavens. Surely it will not lead us to glorify the military prowess of that nation of nations, since wars will be no longer possible, or if they sometimes flash out, it will be like riots in our cities, to be suppressed by the law, backed by the moral sentiment of the world. Rather, it will demand loyalty to the confederation which gives security to all races and lands and leaves the nations free to follow their highest development, not groaning under the enormous burdens of military establishments, nor forever on the watch and shaking with dread of sudden destruction by some stronger power. Patriotism will no longer relate to our particular patria, — the United States, let us say, or the state of Ohio, or the city of Washington, — and it will not be called patriotism, but something higher. Let us call it fellowship, if you please, brotherhood, humanism, enthusiasm of humanity, civilization, Christianity, for it will be the fruition of that Christianity taught by the Master. It will mark the final substitution of right reason for brute courage. Just as the latter lost its ferocity and was transfused into mental and moral qualities as the old individual antagonisms gave way, and finally found its chief field not in war but in the arts of peace, so the new patriotism will look upon the old glorification of war, the fierce delight in slaughter and destruction, as wild deliriums of fever, the ghastly and haggard nightmares of a night that is past.

To this hope, to this ideal, let us yield our admiration, our reverence, our obedience, our love. Toward it let

us strive, though we may not attain. Sometime, somewhere, man will realize that for which we vainly yearn. Humanity will cast away its cruel and foolish burden of jealousy and antagonism, and with light heart and mutual encouragement climb the long spirals of progress which seem, indeed, ever to return upon themselves, but still rise forever skyward. Whether there is a goal of perfection we cannot say, but surely the spiral will rise to clear skies and a broad horizon, from which it will look back upon what we call civilization with the same wonder and repugnance with which we regard that geological period when "a monstrous eft was of old the lord and master of life."

IV

CAN WAR BE DEFENDED ON THE AUTHORITY OF CHRIST?

It will probably not be questioned that what may be classed as the Christian thought of this or almost any civilized country embraces the greater proportion of its trained intelligence. In this class we must reckon not the members of churches only, but great numbers of our best citizens who affiliate with them, and who through education and inheritance adhere more or less closely to the accepted religious beliefs. Still more emphatically is it true that the class represents the highest development of altruism, the loftiest motives, the most generous self-sacrifice, the most unselfish lives. If united, therefore, it is easy to see that it would dominate not merely the domestic but the foreign policy of our government. Doubtless it is fortunate that there has been little if any tendency toward an ecclesiastical party, for reasons which I need not specifically point out, but which may be easily gathered from what follows. Now, it is very remarkable, but I think quite plain, that this body of thought will generally be found favoring the most selfish, indiscriminate, brutal, wasteful, and most ineffectual means of settling differences among men. In theory it is opposed to war, but very rarely in a concrete instance. If it does not actively champion, it hardly ever squarely

sets itself against it. A very large proportion of the wars of the last ten centuries have turned upon or involved religious questions. One country easily condemns the war undertaken by another, but never its own. During the War of the Rebellion the ears of the Almighty were assailed with the frantic cries of Christians on both sides for the destruction of their fellow citizens and Christian brethren. The war with Spain and the prolonged struggle in the Philippines received the somewhat exuberant approval of this class; and the same was true in England concerning the Boer War. This was, of course, far from unanimous; and in our case it may be conceded that it was given somewhat grudgingly at the outset, but with the outbreak of hostilities all reluctance disappeared. The class called for further bloodshed in China, not in direct terms, but as a necessary consequence. It insisted that its missions should be maintained and extended by military force, if need be.

Now, if Christianity were a mere extension of the old Judaism, this attitude would not be hard to understand. In that religion Jahveh was primarily a tribal war god, who afterwards attached himself to the soil or territory occupied by his chosen people. Outside of this he claimed no jurisdiction and cared nothing for what took place. He exacted no worship, and left other peoples to the management of their own particular gods. He was, however, extremely jealous of the homage of his own people, and for any infraction of his rights visited them with terrible punishments. He entered into a solemn covenant with them, by which, so long as they faithfully observed their obligation, he undertook not only to

protect them from attack but to enable them, through his direct aid and leadership, to conquer and destroy their neighbors and enter into possession of their lands. Thus religion reënforced the lower instincts of men by making robbery and murder a religious duty. By stimulating and approving their natural selfishness and greed, it intensified the antagonisms which we have seen to be inevitable in the beginnings of life. Up to the time of Christ the Jewish mind had failed to grasp the idea of the fatherhood of God and the unity of the human race. Jahveh was, popularly speaking, the God of the Jew only. Of course their conception broadened, in spite of the efforts of their priests and teachers to shut them up to the narrower view. Whether the result was, on the whole, bad or good is of no concern to the present contention.

To a greater extent than is generally realized, these ideas passed into Christianity. They have never been wholly eliminated, though greatly modified. During its infancy Christianity naturally looked for the same kind of protection against violence from without which Judaism had claimed for itself. When it became strong enough to seize the secular power it sought to use it, as the Jews had done, for the extension of the kingdom of God. Until the temporal power was lost to the Pope, there was never any doubt as to the right and duty of employing it directly for the destruction of heathen or heretical governments and institutions. Upon the ashes of pagan fanes it has reared its temples, bearing aloft the symbol of passive suffering. In the blood-soaked soil of ruined nations it has planted the laurel and the bay, from which to gather its garlands to deck the brow which wore

the crown of thorns. It has never hesitated to claim that its devastating armies were led by the Prince of Peace.

It seems, indeed, as if Christianity has felt compelled to propagate itself by any means which came to its hand. Holding its doctrines and practice to be of the supremest importance to man, whose eyes are blinded and whose will is paralyzed by sin, its devotees have felt that they were doing the noblest service in compelling him to accept that salvation without which he is doomed. So far the feeling is not indeed selfish, however misguided. Selfishness has, however, always availed itself of the zeal of the Church to secure its own ends. Traditional Christianity itself has never stopped to inquire whether men desire it. From its vantage ground it has said they need and must have it, whether they will or no. It was in the ages of faith, when no doubt perplexed the heart of the Church, that its zeal for propagandism was at its height. It is only in modern times, when largely infused with the secular reason, that it has come to see that religion cannot be imposed upon men by force, and so has consented to give up the sword to the civil authorities. But while it no longer insists upon war as a direct instrumentality for the introduction of Christianity or the suppression of heresy, it is exceedingly prone to see in it new opportunities for forwarding its interests. It has become sensitive to the odium of bloodshed, but is willing that the State should incur the reproach while it, as a silent partner, reaps the benefit. It has lost much of its old relish for martyrdom also, and is satisfied to allow the army to be a sort of John the Baptist, preparing its way and making its paths safe.

Let me absolutely disclaim any intent to minimize the importance of Christianity in its essential doctrines and nature. I am speaking of organized Christianity, as represented by those who have controlled its movements rather than its life and growth. Perhaps I should have spoken of it as ecclesiasticism, though the attitude I have described seems to be that of all but a small minority of Christians. Above all, I should regret to have it supposed that I could speak slightingly of those engaged in missionary work. Among the good men and women whom it has been my happy privilege to know, some of the very noblest, most unselfish, and most lovable have been of this class. Nor do I stigmatize the Church for its past history, which, taking all things into account, could not probably have been other than it has been, for like everything else it is a product of the circumstances in which it has been placed. I am trying to account for what appears to me a most remarkable and perplexing fact. I believe the Church means to be loyal to its founder, yet at the same time has entirely perverted his teaching on a point upon which the whole turns. It is its very zeal to carry out the instructions of the Master which has led it into the repudiation of the fundamental principle which he laid down. "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature" was his command. But if in some places this creature shall refuse to receive me, and upon my benevolent persistence shall oppose my entrance, and to my preaching reply with blows, what then? Meet violence with violence is the practical answer, not for your own sake but for his. When you have convinced the misguided wretch of your physical

superiority he will be ready to see the superiority of your religion. This is not merely a horrible perversion of the teaching of Christ; it is grotesque. If it were not the most solemn and terrible thing in the world, it would be the most humorous.

It is not in the least unusual for men to carry about in their heads ideas that are utterly inconsistent and even contradictory without knowing it. But here we are discussing not a question of reason, but of authority only; not whether the teaching of Christ is right, though I believe it is, but what the teaching was. If this is clear and certain, it is for the Church to say whether it will accept it or repudiate it. If for any reason it thinks it is not now binding upon the world, it is for it to explain on what principle it may be rejected. If it is able calmly to set it aside, it should further explain what it understands by the headship of Christ, and whether the rest of his teaching can in like manner be disregarded.

It will nowhere be questioned, within the Church or outside of it, that at the beginning of his ministry Christ came with a message of peace, the same which, according to Luke, the angels announced at his birth. The kingdom of God which it was his immediate mission to establish was a brotherhood of man. It swept away all class privilege and placed all upon an absolute equality of right, under the operation of a single controlling principle,—the law of love. The kingdom of heaven belonged to the poor in spirit. It was the meek who were to inherit the earth. Not only was it forbidden that one should be angry with his brother; he might not, until he had

exhausted every effort, allow his brother to be angry with him. If at the altar he remembered that his brother had against him any cause for complaint, reasonable or otherwise, his first duty was not sacrifice but reconciliation. Not only so, but he must love his enemies. The doctrine of non-resistance is as clearly and unmistakably set forth as language can state it. "Resist not him that is evil; but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." They might not avail themselves of the civil courts in any differences with outsiders. If one should seek through legal process to take the coat, they must tender the cloak also.

Let it be conceded that this is pressing the principle very far, quite exceeding the requirement of the golden rule, which exacted such treatment of another as one might properly ask to receive. This, to a right-minded person, would be fairness. It is no part of the present purpose to inquire whether the doctrine of non-resistance is sound, but merely whether Christ consistently taught it. If it is not binding upon the Church, it is because of one or the other of two things: either the doctrine was inherently unsound and Christ was mistaken in holding it, or, while it was correctly held and taught in the beginning, he at a later time changed his mind. The theological consequence is the same: one of these views is erroneous. It does not help matters to say that conditions had changed. As a matter of fact, they had not within the few months that had intervened between the first and last utterance. But there is not the slightest hint that either teaching is for a temporary condition or related to the conduct of the disciples only. Everything

indicates that it was a principle laid down for all time. Did altered conditions abrogate the golden rule? Did Christ advise his followers that in the changed conditions they should repay evil with evil? If he was wildly visionary at the outset, how does the Church reconcile this fact with its teaching that he was "very God of very God"? As a fact, slowly changing conditions have not made the lofty altruism of Christ less, but far more practicable.

We must not lose sight of the question raised. What authority for war can be found in the teachings of Christ? The appeal is to the record; it is a matter of interpretation only. What men who think they accept Christ's teachings believe to be right or expedient has nothing to do with the inquiry. When we come to put together the utterances upon which they argue that he approved or permitted war we shall see what a very slender foundation they have for the tremendous inference, logically dragging down his whole teaching and destroying at a blow the accepted theory of his nature.

According to Matthew, in sending forth his disciples he said: "Think not that I came to send peace on the earth. I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I came to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law against her mother in law; and a man's foes shall be they of his own household." Now it may be conceded that Christ foresaw future wars as a consequence of two contending systems of thought and conduct; but this is not a necessary inference from the language. He did foresee that his teachings would meet with opposition,

and he expressly warns his disciples to expect it. But this opposition is not that of one community against another. Division is to run not on political lines, but through all communities and cutting asunder the ties of family life. At a later date he did predict wars, — "Nation shall rise against nation and kingdom against kingdom," — but in these, so far as the record goes, his followers were to have no part. They are not to be terrified when they hear of wars and tumults. Their trials were to come in a different way. Parents and brethren and kinsfolk and friends would deliver them up to the authorities; but there is no suggestion that they should be involved in wars, or that they should resort to any violence. There will be great destruction of the Jews, and Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the Gentiles; but "your redemption draweth nigh."

But returning to the account in Matthew, the disciples were sent on their mission without any of those provisions which worldly prudence would dictate. They were to take neither money nor food nor change of raiment. They would be brought into courts; but they were to have no anxiety and make no preparation. "It shall be given you in that hour what ye shall speak." He counsels no resistance, much less the use of offensive force. "When they persecute you in this city, flee into the next"; and apparently he does not look for any long-continued opposition, for "Ye shall not have gone through the cities of Israel till the Son of man be come." Now, taking this together, it shows that he looked for opposition and persecution, but it utterly fails to show that he contemplated or permitted the use of force in

any shape or degree on the part of his followers. Imagine from his lips in this connection an exhortation to the warlike life!

There are perhaps one or two other passages slightly varying this language, but in nowise changing its significance. There is also a passage, found only in Luke, which on its face seems to sanction the use of force. After the last supper at Jerusalem, just before Christ's parting from his disciples, he says to them: "When I sent you forth without purse, and wallet, and shoes, lacked ye anything?" And they said, "Nothing." "But now," he replies, "he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise a wallet: and he that hath none, let him sell his cloak, and buy a sword. For I say unto you, that this which is written must be fulfilled in me: *And he was reckoned with transgressors.*" And they said, "Lord, behold, here are two swords." And he said unto them, "It is enough."

Enough for what? To suppose that he could have meant that the possession of two swords by his disciples was a sufficient preparation to meet force with force, much less to commence a campaign of violence for the spread of his teaching, is too absurd for the most robust credulity. To resort to such an interpretation, unless the language absolutely requires it, is contrary to every principle of exegesis; it sets aside the presumption that Christ manifested at least the intelligence of ordinary men.

But it is on its moral still more than on its intellectual side that such an interpretation is most repugnant. We might conceive that the great success of his ministry in

Galilee had warped the judgment of Christ, as we know it had that of his followers. But to suppose that he had set aside the fundamental principle which he came to proclaim is to deprive his life and teaching of all moral significance. It would be to revise the beatitudes. It is no longer the meek who should inherit the earth, but the man on horseback.

Fortunately there is not the slightest necessity for such an interpretation. Beyond all controversy the evangelist here cites a Scripture prophecy which Christ declares is about to be fulfilled. What is that prediction? Obviously that contained in the words, "And he was reckoned with the transgressors." The Greek word is *ἀνόμων* — the lawless. But while Jesus may have treated Jewish ceremonial with scant respect, he had never violated municipal law nor countenanced its violation by others. He had paid tribute or poll tax like any good citizen. Whatever his feeling toward the Roman government may have been, he had carefully avoided any utterance which might be construed as treasonable or unfriendly to Cæsar. But now, in fulfillment of this Scripture, he must in some way be classed as a law-breaker. How was this to be done? For his followers to offer resistance to the officer of the law would be on his part a technical breach of the law. For this purpose two swords are enough. It is highly probable, too, that the carrying of arms by a Jew was forbidden, and was thus an actual offense.

I do not know but this explanation is very trite. My knowledge of Scripture commentary is of the slightest, as I have never had a taste for that form of literature.

Once pointed out, however, the meaning of the passage is so clear that only the most ingenious perversity could construe it as an approval of the use of violence in any case.

If it be said that this is a far-fetched prophecy with a feeble fulfillment, I answer that the difficulty is not of my making. If the incident is not historical, no argument can be based upon it. If the writer has misstated or misapplied the words of Christ, any inference that he justified war under any circumstances is just as obviously a mistaken one. I merely insist that I have given the plain meaning of the text, the construction which Luke himself puts upon it. It is in complete harmony with what follows. It is Peter, always hot-headed, who draws his sword and cuts off the ear of the officer or attendant, "the servant of the high priest." "Put up again thy sword into its place" is the rather stern command, "for all they that take the sword shall perish by the sword." He immediately turns the incident into a moral object lesson, the same which he has all along taught. "Suffer ye thus far," or "suffer even this," he says, and with a touch he heals the wound. He might, he affirms, bring to his aid more than twelve legions of angels; but to use force, even a supernatural force, would be to defeat his moral purpose. To Pilate he says: "If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews." It was because it was a spiritual kingdom that it might not be maintained by the means employed by earthly monarchs. His own example gave a force and meaning to his teaching that could have been secured in no other way. It was not so

much his preaching in Galilee as his death on the cross that has won for him his mighty following. It was the complete exemplification of all that for which his life and teachings had stood. Not alone to his disciples, but to all men, he taught the lesson the world is so slow to receive, — the power of love to conquer evil.

If in view of changing circumstances or of his own removal from them, Jesus had meant to give a new rule, to indoctrinate his disciples with those considerations of worldly prudence of which men in general have something of a superfluity, there was a singular inconsistency between his words and his actions. Indeed, we must think his language was strangely inappropriate to his meaning. Some of his followers were quite quick enough to meet force with force. They had really almost entirely failed to grasp the idea of a spiritual kingdom. They had been anxious to call down fire upon those who had refused to receive them, but who had offered no violence at all. It was the mild, spiritual, beloved John, not the quick, impulsive Peter, who had wished to pour these literal coals of fire on the heads of those who had perhaps at farthest shown them some disrespect. They had quarreled with each other as to who should have the highest place in the kingdom. Yet not one of them understood Christ to be instructing them to resort to the agencies upon which the world relies and to meet force with force. On the contrary, they now for the first time began to have some dim conception of his spiritual mission. His patient endurance of wrong, his unjust sufferings, his meek obedience unto death, his prayer, in the midst of the agony of the cross,

for those who were inflicting this upon him, completed the lesson. The disciples went everywhere, unarmed and unresisting, carrying only the message of love. They shrank from no persecutions nor danger, and seemed to seek out opportunities for martyrdom. They met with shame and scoffing, with imprisonment and stripes, and finally with violent death; but not one, so far as we know, offered any resistance or raised even the slightest complaint. Paul, the great apostle to the Gentiles, even more fully, though not more clearly, set forth the doctrine of non-resistance. More than this, he illustrated it by his life; but at the same time his language is full of the imagery of war. The Christian is a soldier. Life is a warfare. The believer must put on "the whole armor of God," "the breastplate of righteousness," and "the helmet of salvation." With girt loins he must take "the shield of faith" and "the sword of the spirit." Yet it is not with flesh and blood that he is to wrestle, and he must have his feet shod with "the preparation of the *gospel of peace*." This sword of the spirit may well be the sword which Christ says it was his mission to send. If it is a consolation to any one to think that he foresaw the great religious wars that were to come through a perversion of his teachings, I surely will not deny him that comfort. Certainly he never authorized these wars, or gave any hint toward their justification.

Whether the teaching of Jesus is practicable I shall consider in another chapter. I believe that I have fairly shown here, upon the most obvious and reasonable construction of the few passages in which justification of

war is sought, that he did not allow the use of force even in self-defense. If a different interpretation is possible, it is certainly not the necessary nor the natural one. It will be readily conceded, on the other hand, — indeed I do not suppose that it has ever been questioned, — that he clearly and unmistakably taught the doctrine of non-resistance, the passive endurance of wrong; that he fully exemplified this doctrine in his life and in his death; that it is as fully set forth, with as complete implication that it was a universal principle, for all circumstances and times, as the law of love, — in fact, that it is a part of that; that his disciples perfectly understood his teachings on this point and, though some of them were hot-blooded enough, followed his teaching and example with the most remarkable devotion. The example of the disciples was in turn followed by primitive Christianity; it was only when the new faith had become firmly established that force was thought of either for protection or as a means of propagandism.

Whether it is possible to live without war would seem, therefore, to depend entirely on the desire and will. If there are any circumstances under which the teaching of Christ would allow it, it would appear that it is in case of self-defense. But during the whole period of its weakness Christianity found it perfectly practicable and expedient to get along without it. Only after Christianity grew strong and did not need it for protection, it began to use it, because it believed, or affected to believe, that the spread of its influence justified the use of violence. It is the argument that is still used, but not in a shape quite so offensive.

If fully satisfied that Jesus approved or permitted war, Christianity should rest in that conviction, since it holds that he spoke with absolute and final authority. In fact, it is not and never has been satisfied. The contradiction between this and the doctrine of non-resistance is too plain to be ignored by the most hardened believer. It is driven at the outset to apology. The only explanation it can offer is that he changed his view. The necessary consequence is to conclude that the doctrine of non-resistance was impracticable, and that his earlier teaching was a delusion. But with the ever-widening sense of human brotherhood, the conviction has deepened that the law of love is the permanent and universal rule for the guidance of human conduct, and that war with its dreadful destruction and enormous suffering cannot be reconciled with it. Christianity has therefore shifted its ground. Oh, yes, war is horrible, and Christ did not approve of it as a permanent principle; but he allowed it for a season because in the state of society which he found and which he left it is unavoidable. There will come a time of universal peace, — in the millennium. War has not been eliminated, because the evil passions of men, their selfishness, sin, and folly have not been eliminated. When Christianity is everywhere accepted war will cease. Very good. War is permissible, then, because based on the selfishness, folly, and sin of men. Christ sanctioned it because it is sinful or selfish. But this will apply equally to lying, stealing, burglary, arson, and murder.

Perhaps I do not need to call attention to the fact that this is also an entire abandonment of the argument from

authority, which must be sought in what Christ said, not in what we think he ought to have said. To say that war is a necessity, and that therefore Christ allowed it, is moreover a mere begging of the question. To say that he changed his final instructions because, being divine, he must have given such as are practicable, is open to the same objection. We cannot frame conclusions for him, but accept such as are fairly indicated in his recorded utterances as the basis of our own. For those that really accept the divinity of Christ to set a certain standard to which the divine wisdom must conform is not merely absurd but impious. Shift the ground as we may, therefore, no justification of war can be found in the words or acts of Christ. If war is defensible, it must be upon grounds of reason. Thou appealest unto Cæsar; to Cæsar thou shalt go.

V

CAN WAR BE DEFENDED ON GROUNDS OF REASON?

It will be well at the outset to define the precise point at issue. It is not the question whether at some period in the life of the race, under the conditions which existed and with the mental and moral development which had been attained, war was a necessity and so justifiable, but whether it is so now. It is not even whether now a community may justifiably defend itself if attacked. It would be as pertinent to raise that question in the case of the individual; it would be merely asking whether it is justifiable to live. But it takes two parties to engage in war, and if one has, in all the steps which led up to it, been striving to avoid any just offense, the other must just as certainly have been striving to secure an unjust advantage. If one is truly the helpless victim, the other is as certainly the wanton aggressor. In fact, these unmixed conditions rarely present themselves in modern warfare, both parties being controlled largely by their traditions and prejudices. At the best, the rational motive on the one side is balanced by the irrational one on the other. There are reasons and reasons on the part of both, it may be; but from the standpoint of reason itself there may be no justification of this particular war. Reason puts itself outside of the particular motives and

views of the parties to the strife, to consider whether the end gained justifies the means employed; whether, taking all the results into the account, not to this party or that, nor even to both, but as affecting the whole race, there has been a gain which will equal the loss. It is not a question whether wars will cease in the immediate or distant future, but whether from the standpoint of reason they ought to. No one supposes that lying, robbery, arson, murder, and other crimes will cease; but they are not approved by reason. The inquiry is whether war, as an instrumentality, on the whole serves a useful purpose. It is the same question which arises in individual misunderstandings and wrongs. Does the duel, the street fight, the mob, serve a useful purpose?[1] That some incidental good comes from these, in certain rare cases, may be conceded; but does it overbalance the evils, or has it been economically obtained? Does it bear a fair proportion to the expenditure of effort? Those engaged in them have, it may be, at the time

[1] A good illustration comes to hand as I am preparing this chapter. In a Southern village a negro had been confined in the calaboose to await trial. Some citizens, in the exercise of zeal for the public good, attacked the building and set fire to it, after killing the prisoner. This was quite in accord with the prevailing sentiment of the community, and if not actively commended would under ordinary circumstances have been approved. It chanced that the blazing calaboose set fire to an adjoining building, and that to another, and finally the business part of the village was wiped out. This was not what was bargained for, and the indignation of those who had lost their property waxed hot against the mob, and four or five members of it were indicted by the grand jury. Now, if it were apparent to the community that every act of violence by the individual, mob, or state was going to cost it something, for which a very insignificant benefit would accrue, such outbreaks would cease to have apologists.

found reasons to justify their acts; but shall we? If it were a question whether passion and prejudice will continue, I should not care to argue the case; but it will not be alleged that these are rational. If war is defensible on rational grounds, it must be shown that it works a gain — material, mental, or moral — which could not have been secured in some other way, or at least without greater expense. It is not enough to show that some gains follow war, unless it also appears that these could not have been as fully secured under conditions of peace. We know very well the great increase in strength, vigor, activity, and zest for life which often follows a fever that has brought one near the gates of death; but not many will regard the fever as a desirable agency for the attainment of health. So much good follows shipwreck that there is a class of people who think it proper to help bring it about by placing false lights to mislead the pilot.

There is one consideration, and one only, which seems to me to be entitled to weight, and which it is not altogether easy to answer. It is that war is a necessity, and however earnestly men may strive to avoid it, they are unable to do so. There is a kind of fate in it, and nations are driven to it because in the very nature of things it must be so. It is like sickness, pain, and death, — and, however unpleasant, we must submit. The instinct for fighting is imbedded deeply in the constitution of things. Conflict goes on incessantly among all forms of life. Life, in fact, begins in a sort of conflict, a reaction against its environment. We cannot observe it nor know whether it exists disassociated from a physical organism, but far back as we may go we find some

portion of this organism moved by an inward force which we must conclude to be the "little living will." The latter we do not pretend to explain. It is part of the mystery of life itself. The movement of the organism thus set up impinges upon something fixed or relatively immobile in the external world, which through reaction propels the entire organism through space. Thus, in amœbæ, microscopic bits of colorless jelly, without organs, a slight protuberance is thrust out from the body and withdrawn, the principle being something like that employed in sculling. In others of these rudimentary forms of life, two exceedingly delicate threads which may be regarded as oars are waved about in the water. From these up to man and in all the complicated movements which he imparts to matter there is in this respect no change of principle. All are exemplifications of the law of action and reaction. Without resistance there could be no motion. All this is profoundly true.

When it comes to the preservation and development of life it is the same. The creature must have food, and is thus brought into competition with other forms of life whose interests and wills are absolutely antagonistic. This has been indicated in the preceding chapters; but to let the argument for war be made as complete as possible, I will outline the general course of development from a slightly different point of view. At the threshold of life we find two organisms, one of which must be destroyed for the benefit of the other. It is not a matter of sentiment but necessity. There is no other food supply than that found in existing forms of life. There is no possibility of increasing resources by effort. If the two

do not come into direct collision through the attempt to eat each other, they will in their efforts to appropriate a third. Nay, the antagonism goes far beyond this. Since life feeds only on life, to bring one form to maturity involves the sacrifice of a multitude of others. The process does not cease with man. No adult man or woman exists to whose development countless myriads of lower forms have not contributed. Not only so, but all superiority has come from struggle. The exercise of existing powers brings increase of strength, adaptation, and facility. Any slight modification which proved useful would tend not only to perpetuate itself, but through greater and greater extension would finally develop into special organs.

The law of increase and perfection through use holds good also throughout the mental and moral world. The civilized man, no less than the savage, has attained only because he has striven. Civilization has indeed provided largely for the protection of the weak, but it is for his preservation only. He can rise only through struggle, which has indeed changed the objects toward which strife is directed, but makes it none the less exacting. Conflict, therefore, must go on to the end. To put an end to war — that is the argument — is to arrest human development. In the whole order of things, including man and society, the strong has always dominated the weak. It may give a shock to the moral sense, but we are helpless to change the order imposed upon us from without, even though we may conceive that it is wrong.

This is as full and fair a statement of this argument in favor of or excuse for war as the limits of this

discussion will allow. The data for its refutation also have been given in the preceding discussion. I need here only state some of the generalizations reached or easily deducible therefrom. We have noticed that the absolute antagonisms pertain only to the lowest forms of life, and that they have steadily diminished with the rising scale; that at quite an early period some combination and coöperation began; that with this, possibly before, the mental development began to be more important than mere physical superiority. We have seen also that the struggles in the earliest stages of life related wholly to food. This was the case also with the primitive man. The argument from analogy would lead to the conclusion that our wars should be only to obtain food, and that having slain our foe we should eat him.

But we saw that with the lower animals combination led to no increase of production; it was only a means of more easily reducing to possession the things that nature had provided ready-made. The use of tools was wholly unknown to them, and even with primitive man there had as yet come no thought of adding to that which nature had provided. His tools would be only sticks or stones, which the development of the hand enabled him to grasp, and these made him, in combination with his fellows, superior to the most formidable animals, such as the cave bear and lion. In this combination, and for the successful use of these primitive weapons, it is apparent that cunning and skill were more important than strength. The mental development rather than the physical gave to man the first place in the animal scale. As this mental development went on it finally dawned upon him that

he could add to the products of nature. We need not follow the steps. The time came when that which nature had provided was trifling compared with that which he could produce from her stores. He has not yet fairly realized that the resources of nature are practically infinite; but he begins to see that for the economical exploitation of these he needs the help of his fellows, working in all directions, since progress in any direction makes progress in every other easier. In all this the use of his muscular powers steadily gave way to the devices contrived by his mental powers, and one force of nature was used to manipulate another. What we call hand labor is not that at all. But while much of this is required in some lines of work, it is greatly outweighed by the forces of nature applied to the machinery and contrivances of man. In by far the greater sphere of human industry the possession of great physical strength is of little or no advantage, while skill and dexterity are indispensable. Brawn is now at the foot in the industrial scale and receives the smallest reward. Physical development, except so far as it contributes to health, is of no importance to a very large proportion of the human race.

The combination of men, in the beginning, we may be perfectly certain, was for purely utilitarian purposes. There were at this stage no government, no law, no society, no settled customs of any sort. There was no affection on man's part toward his fellow, the members of his family possibly excepted. But combination involves the suspension, at least, of the old antagonisms. He gave up some things in order that he might gain more. The consequence, beyond the immediate end, was not

perceived probably at all, and would not have seemed an object worth striving after. As everywhere else, men here moved along the lines of least resistance, supplying the necessities with the smallest expenditure of effort. But this was a matter of give and-take, and the concession of something to another soon begot the idea of personal and property rights. The areas of antagonism, therefore, constantly diminished, while the community of interest as constantly increased.

Now, if this law holds good throughout, we may say that the time will come when all antagonisms will be eliminated, and community of interest will become universal. I do not mean by this that there will be common possession of property; for so far, through all this progression, the right of property has been more and more distinctly recognized. With closer association and common interests, the altruistic spirit found a great development. In just what it had its beginning it is not necessary here to decide. I do not accept the view of Mr. Fiske that it originated in and because of the lengthened period of infancy in the human race, as it surely existed in a rudimentary form very far back of man. It would be hard to show, likewise, that affection for offspring is different in the case of man and the lower animals, except that in the first case it may be associated with greater prudence and intelligence; nor does it appear even that it is more intense. In both cases it serves its purpose of protecting the young until they are ready to shift for themselves.[1] It seems to me that it would have

[1] It is in order, also, to inquire whether Mr. Fiske has not put the cause for the effect. Since life always and everywhere does not what it

its beginning in the first community of interest, and this would be found almost at the basis of life, in sex. But to whatever circumstance its inception may be due, there can be no doubt that in its development it has kept equal step with the human race. If I am correct in my view of its evolution, the condition of society at a given stage has not been the planned effort of an earlier age, but an unforeseen result. Institutions and social forms have not been a definite object to strive for, but have grown out of usage, acquiesced in for a considerable period. They do not represent aspiration so much as history. They are a mere crystallization and hardening of precedent. Immediate utilitarian ends have always been the object, but greater ends have been achieved unsought. Throughout his whole history man has sought to supply his wants and desires in the easiest way. To what his efforts will finally lead, what the ultimate power in the universe has planned for him, we need not determine.

Wars have been waged, therefore, because they seemed to be useful in supplying immediate ends or desires, the gratification of revenge being one of them. But if there is anything plain in the lessons of history and of political

would but what it must, is it not the case that the care provided by the parent, making exertion on the part of the infant unnecessary, accounts for the infant's helplessness? At least the period of infancy continues to lengthen not as a necessary consequence of civilization or altruism, but because parental solicitude takes away more and more the incentives for effort. We begin to see now what could not be found in primitive man, great numbers of people in whom infancy never ends at all. If, as Professor Drummond argues, the claw of the hermit crab furnishes a case of degradation because of the disuse of that member, which is no longer a necessity, his house furnishing the necessary protection, will not the same thing explain the lengthening period of infancy?

economy, it is the wastefulness of war. It produces absolutely nothing for the use of mankind, though prolific enough in devices for still greater waste and destruction. The distribution in the form of plunder of that which exists is accomplished at great disadvantage and loss. Add to this the wanton destruction of life and property, and it should be clear to the dullest that the elimination of such an agency would be, from a strictly utilitarian standpoint, of the utmost importance to the world, somewhat answering to but greatly exceeding that of the substitution of money and credit for rude barter in commerce. It may well be doubted whether the most successful war in modern times was profitable for the victors. What has it been to the vanquished? It would seem that the intelligence of man ought to be able to find a means of ridding him of this enormous and unnecessary burden.

The moral aspects of the case have been so much discussed and are so well understood that I shall not here consider them. Wars will cease, I believe, only when men come to realize that they do not pay. It may be well, however, to notice that since the successful exploitation of nature requires the combined efforts of mankind, and since such a combination, resting on confidence, is dependent on the moral development of the race, then from a purely material point of view the greatest disaster is not the destruction of life and property, but the degradation of the moral status. Morally and, I believe, mentally war is a complete reversal of progress and a straight return toward the abysm from which life has emerged.

A few lesser considerations in this connection should receive brief attention. Man, it is urged, with all his great advance, remains a fighting animal. Forcible resistance to any encroachment upon his rights is as instinctive as ever. The *gaudium certaminis* is deeply imbedded in his nature. To take away the occasion for that supreme effort found only in battle would be to destroy the principle of the survival of the fittest, and would lead to physical degeneration. This has already been considered in part. It is perhaps sufficient to add that it is largely a mistake in fact. The instinct to fight is by no means as vigorous as with primitive man. So far as it exists, it is a survival. Neither ape nor tiger has been eliminated from man, but they are slowly dying. The physical development of man is no longer a first consideration. Mr. Fiske has noted the change of direction in human development. From the mere animal standpoint, the joy of fight is well enough for the victor; but what is it to the vanquished? To the windrows of dead or mangled men, shot through with bullets, torn by shells, hacked with swords, trampled with hoofs, dismembered, disemboweled, joy of any sort has ceased to be even a memory.

Finally, as to the argument from the order of nature, it must be said that it is inapplicable, for the reason that civilized man is no longer in that order. Physically he is of course at the head of it; but he constitutes a genus of his own. As a member of society he is living almost entirely under artificial conditions. He cannot escape his physical nature, to be sure, without ceasing to live; but he has modified it in many ways, bringing it into

subjection to ideals of right rather than to the promptings of inherited appetites. It matters not that the new conditions are self-imposed. They exist and control men just as truly, if not as extensively, as the purely natural conditions.

Another argument gravely put forth is of much greater importance seemingly than in fact. All government, we are told, is in the last analysis based upon physical force. Law has no self-executing power, and wherever it is disregarded or is inadequate to preserve order the military force must be called in. The entire physical strength and control of a community may thus be required to suppress revolt against the law of the land. Wrongdoing is and ought to be punished by force, pain, or death inflicted upon the body, or confinement and detention against the will. Children and dependents are restrained and punished. Communities, therefore, that show themselves criminal or hostile to the whole order of civilization should be annihilated or controlled by the more advanced nations. Those who are incapable of managing their own affairs must, in their own interest, be brought into subjection to nations that know how to govern them. The highly civilized nations thus enact the rôle of the schoolmaster or policeman.

Here, again, the question turns largely upon the consideration of data already given. The fact is that the assumption is a fundamental misconception. It has been much too readily conceded by those who deprecate the inferences drawn from it. If anything is clear from the preceding discussion, it is that in governments, as well as

in individual life, physical force has constantly tended to disappear, being transmuted into moral force, law, custom, habit, precedent. From sheer compulsion, government more and more rests upon consent and community of interest. A conquered nation or community, ruled by a military force, would not rest upon the consent of the governed, but it would be very far removed from a government of pure force. That profound modification which has come from inheritance and training, both on the part of conqueror and conquered, is an immense factor in the actual rule. Since the time of primitive man, and even in the rudimentary government of animal communities, the basis is not purely physical. An element of physical force, it is true, remains in all governments, much greater in some than in others, but in all governments it is diminishing. It may be said that among certain criminals fear is the only motive which can or does restrain from crime. Even this cannot be conceded without qualification. Among the most hardened some habits of obedience to authority remain, and if there is not much respect for the rights of property, there is, except among a small minority, considerable respect for life. At the very worst, they have a certain loyalty to their fellow criminals, and some organization and community of interest. They could not carry on their nefarious business without it. This may be unfortunate for society, but it none the less defeats the proposition in controversy. With reference to its own class, it presents some analogy to the association of wild dogs or jackals for the purpose of plunder, which is nevertheless a remove from the old basis of absolute physical force,

and a step higher in the mental scale. With reference to society, it presents rather the aspect of two communities imperfectly assimilated and in partial, not total, antagonism to each other.

The theory carries with it the assumption that to the support of any law the entire force of the community may be brought. The person or persons who administer the government are like the engineer who by pulling a lever may apply to the turning of his wheels the entire expansive force of the steam which can be generated from the water in his boiler through the potential energy of the coal in the tender. As a fact, nothing of the sort can be done. But if all the energy of a nation could be, as it were, gathered into a single hand, upon what domestic concern could it be expended? The very proposition is contradictory. If a part of the community is in revolt against the law, the entire power of the community is not united, nor can it be used by any central authority. If the opposition amounted to a large minority, it would be civil war. If exactly divided, a condition never realized in actual practice, then the expenditure of the entire physical force of the community would be to annihilate the entire community.

Further, it should be observed that whatever portion of the force of the community a government can bring to bear upon an opposing or rebellious faction, it must wield it through mental and moral agencies. These agencies, it will be conceded, must consent to its employment. Now, while "the king (the government) can do no wrong," his ministers can. The most absolute of monarchs has sometimes run counter to the moral

sentiment of the community over which he rules, — and has at once found the physical force divided, and the weightier portion arrayed against himself. In this country the fugitive slave law is a good case in point. It was as truly a law, duly and legally enacted, as any ever placed upon the statute books. Was there ever a time when more than a small fraction of the physical force of the nation could have been invoked in its support? Governments, therefore, derive not only their just powers, in the language of the Declaration of Independence, but all their powers, from the consent of the governed. Consent is not approval. In most cases it is given blindly, with no clear perception of what is involved. Some citizens strongly disapprove the policy of their government as to some things, while approving it in its general features. But even if the disapproval were very emphatic, and extended to most things, they might still consent. This is always the case as long as they use only such means of influence to change an act or policy as the structure of the government itself provides, — failing in which they acquiesce. On a purely physical basis they must needs use in opposition their physical force, however inadequate to the extremity. When a man or body of men submits instead of fighting to the death, it is a misuse of words to say that they have yielded to physical force. They have acted under the dominion of ideas of wisdom and prudence, which are moral ideas born, it may be, of experience. And if they, then the other constituent factors, are living under the control of ideas, and the government does not rest on a basis of physical force. In arriving at a *modus*

vivendi, men yield something which they would prefer to keep, yet they consent to the burdens and restrictions, not because they enjoy or even approve them for themselves, but because they are less unpleasant than those they must endure but for the status which the law gives them. The worst government ever instituted among men is better than a condition of pure anarchy, though it may well be questioned whether there ever was such a condition among men. We may, therefore, strenuously object to a particular law, custom, or policy. It may be unfavorable to our individual interests, or even repugnant to our moral sense, and yet we should feel that a resort to physical force, even if successful, would be disastrous. Governments, though of man's own making, are a part of the fixed or slowly changing conditions under which he lives. Man's effort has been and always must be to adapt himself to the moral, intellectual, and social, as well as to the material conditions in which he is placed. For better or for worse, his world will slowly change; but he will change in and with it. He can no more turn back his ideas and habits than he can turn his physical structure back into that of his simian ancestor. That would be to annihilate not merely the progress of the past, but the roadway over which it came. We submit, then, to burdens which we believe to be unnecessary or unjust, rather than be thrown back on the old antagonism and endless and uncompromising conflicts. We follow, let me repeat once more the formula, the lines of least resistance. In doing this, the altruistic sentiment develops as we have seen. Finally we come to take a vicarious pride in the common

progress and attainment, quite aside from a question of personal advantage. The appreciation of the utility of government is, in time, transmuted into a habit of reverence for law and custom, as fixed as religion and not a whit more based upon physical force.

It must not be inferred that I hold a government to be desirable or just which disregards the approval of its citizens or the preponderance of intelligent and deliberate choice of the governed. I am merely looking to the sanctions of government, the basis upon which it rests. It would be just as true to say that family government rests on a physical basis. There was a time when the father might take the life of his child, or the owner of his slave. In England, until a recent date, it was the right of a man to beat his wife with a stick not thicker than his thumb; she was fortunate whose husband's hands were slender and delicate. Within a generation the most cruel punishments have been authorized and employed in schools, the teacher, or master as he was called, standing *in loco parentis*. In England, up to a very recent date, the most trivial offenses were punishable by death. In Elizabeth's time the authorities captured a hundred beggars at once, — men indeed who did not hesitate at violence when necessary in their trade, — hung fifty of them at one time, and only regretted that, from the nature of the offenses, some technical grounds compelled them to await the next assize before hanging the rest. Yet Elizabeth's reign was a prolonged effort to avoid war, not, to be sure, so much from humanitarian as from economic reasons. It was the most fruitful period, too, in English history, not only in moral and intellectual but also in industrial development.

The plain fact is that both in municipal and in family government physical force is more and more giving way to the control of ideas. Even in the treatment of criminals, once regarded as outcasts to whom the public owed no duty, there has been an immense infusion of moral force, to the greatest advantage both of the criminal and the public. Some remnants of physical force are destined to remain for a long time, perhaps always, in the treatment of the untaught and inexperienced; but it is now evident that, whatever the moral deficiency, wrongdoing of all sorts is mainly through lack of perspective. Its cure is a wider intelligence.

What should we do, however, if the moral forces broke down, leaving the government without support? Nothing. There would be nothing to do, and no one to do it. What should we do if the earth fell into the sun?

Again we are confidently told that war brings about conditions which insure prolonged peace. On its face this seems something like a bull, but it is gravely urged. It may be that when one nation has completely crushed another a permanent peace between the two is secured. It is the case of the lamb lying down inside of the lion. History does not, however, offer much encouragement for a long continuance of even this sort of peace. Nations are not, in modern times, wholly destroyed by war. The rapid recuperation of a nation apparently completely exhausted, the ever-renewed conflict with its neighbor, now defeated and now victorious, is the spectacle held out to our view. Assuming that two nations must fight sometime, a war this year may prevent a war ten years hence, more destructive because entered upon with greater preparation and resources on both sides.

The nation now the stronger or better prepared will attack at once instead of waiting for its enemy fully to develop its destructive agencies. But let us not here confuse two entirely different considerations. The strong nation will force the fighting because of its reliance upon its greater physical force. The weaker one will yield long before its powers are exhausted, from the conviction that it must yield at last. It acts upon intellectual and moral considerations, therefore, at least in part, and uses its purely physical forces only far enough to satisfy what it calls its "honor." Nothing is settled by the appeal to arms except the question which of the parties is the stronger at the time. The vanquished nation does not change its opinion as to the rights of the controversy, and if the time should come when it is strong enough successfully to recover its losses or enforce its demands it has no hesitation in doing so. Nations never stand still, but grow or decline from causes within themselves. No nation has ever for a very long period maintained its physical superiority to its neighbors. Somewhere in its history the balance changes, and that nation which has cowed and bullied other nations, harried their coasts, razed their cities, destroyed their warriors, and dashed the heads of children against the wall falls itself into decadence and becomes in turn the prey to all the evils it has inflicted in the day of its pride. No, it is a strange delusion to suppose that peace can be insured through fighting.

There is one way in which it might seem that all the physical force of the world could be united and so find no further use for itself in war. If some powerful nation

could conquer and absorb its neighbors one by one, such a result might follow; and we may conceive conditions under which this might be desirable. Such conditions do not now exist, and there is no certainty that they ever will. A single government for the whole world, if once established, could not long be maintained, as evidently it would not subserve a useful purpose. It would be impossible that all municipal government should be administered from a single source. The diverse conditions in different parts of the earth compel different manners, customs, and laws. To bring all races and peoples into a uniform system is as hopeless as to try to bring into uniformity all differences of climate and soil. But no nation could long pursue this process of assimilation, however benevolent it may seem. The one which is being swallowed will never look at it in that light. If it does not go to pieces from internal causes, there will soon be a combination of other strong nations against it. These will persist in attributing all its self-sacrificing zeal for the good of the world to plain greed. "I came for your good," cried one of the Norman kings upon landing upon English soil; and, less skillful in the use of the language than in arms, he added, "I came for all your goods." And thus it will ever be regarded. But combinations can never be relied on to preserve permanent peace, for the reason that the parties to the combination have their controversies with each other, according to their several interests. They get rid of no antagonisms by mere combination, but strive so to balance force against force that both or all nations shall be unable to act. The relative weight of the groups,

however, cannot be maintained, for reasons heretofore stated. It is impossible for a nation exactly to gauge its own strength or that of its adversary. To ascertain whether there is a balance, resort must be had to that contest which it is the object of the balance to prevent. It is conceded that the European concert has sometimes delayed or prevented wars. It has made every nation cautious about entering upon a course which would involve such horrible consequences. All Europe might now be drawn into collision, and with the dreadful destructiveness of modern appliances the bloodshed would be appalling, even to such as delight in the glory of slaughter. The operation of the concert is, therefore, moral rather than physical. A true balance of power is obviously no more possible than a perfect equilibrium of the physical forces of the universe. It must be constantly adjusted. The attempt of a nation to make such additions to its armament year by year as will insure its superiority to any combination which may be formed against it is equally futile. There is a point beyond which the strain cannot be endured. It is impossible to tell in advance what force it may be called upon to meet. Almost every nation of Europe has, at some period of its history, been now in alliance, and again at war, with every other.

To use force to prevent force, or so to array or distribute it as to make it inoperative, would seem to be hopeless. The alternative is to dispense with it as a means of settling national disputes altogether. So long as force is recognized as a proper means of gaining its ends, a nation with a great standing army, equipped with

the most approved devices for slaughter, will resort to it as against a weaker nation or one it deems such. But if six months or a year were necessary for getting ready to fight, the hot blood would have a chance to cool, and reason and moderation on both sides would find means of just and honorable accommodation. There is not the slightest question that the carrying of arms by private citizens leads to very numerous breaches of the peace and homicides, contrary both to the law and public sentiment. How much more does the carrying of arms by nations lead to collisions, not forbidden by international law, and applauded by the clergy! It is not for me to show that disarmament is practicable. If impracticable, it is not because it would not subserve a vast utility, but from causes that lie outside of reason. One nation may suspect that the others will not act in good faith, but will secretly retain some part of their armament or the means for its speedy rehabilitation. This means that nations cannot trust to or act upon those pledges and assurances which are relied on between individuals. It means not that their fear and distrust are reasonable, but that these survive in international relations long after the necessities out of which they grew have disappeared. Another reason, possibly more potent, is found in the sentiment of honor, so called, which we have already noticed. All the considerations which favor this sentiment can be urged just as favorably with reference to individual honor. A century ago the duel was in almost universal favor as a means of settling disputes where "honor" was involved, and this could be imported into almost any dispute. But the duel has nearly

disappeared among the English-speaking peoples, and is coming into disfavor elsewhere. In Germany it is defended not on moral grounds, nor yet as a desirable means of settling civil controversies, but as aiding to keep up the morale of the army. The army officer must not be moved by the considerations which prevail among good citizens, but by the conventions of a military code. This goes so far that a year or two ago an officer who was jostled on a sidewalk drew his sword and killed a peaceable citizen, and was commended for the act. Yet, apart from some such brutalities, kept alive in the interest of "honor," it can hardly be said that Germans are less humane than Americans or Englishmen. Their "honor" is somewhat more virulent and pestiferous.[1]

Six hundred years before Christ, Buddha laid down the rule which forever excludes the employment of physical force for the settlement of disputes. The proposition appears again and again, and in one place is illustrated by a sort of parable. King Brahmadatta had made war on a weaker king, driven him from his kingdom, and appropriated it. The exiled king, after many wanderings, settles down in disguise in a potter's dwelling, just outside of Benares. He lives a peaceable and harmless life, educates his son, but many years afterwards is discovered by Brahmadatta, who puts him to death, together with his queen. On his way to execution he sees his son, who has returned for a visit, and

[1] At a recent General Synod of the State Church of Prussia, a resolution was introduced condemning dueling as "sinful." Although it was carried, it was opposed by a large minority, both lay and clerical. As usual, it was sought to justify the practice on the authority of the Old Testament.

manages, without betraying his relationship, to give him an important piece of advice. The son afterwards obtains, in disguise, service under Brahmadatta, who presently becomes very fond of him. While hunting one day the king became separated from his retinue, save this young man, and worn out with fatigue he lay down and slept with his head in his lap. Then the young man thought: "This king Brahmadattâ has done us great injury; he robbed us of our kingdom and slew my father and my mother; he is now in my power." Thinking thus, he unsheathed his sword. The king awakes in fright, for he has had a dream, which often haunts him, that the son of the murdered king will slay him. He relates his dream; and the youth lays his left hand upon the king's head, and with the right draws his sword, with these startling words: "I am Dîrghâyu, the son of Dîrghêti, whom you have robbed of his kingdom and slain, with his wife, my mother. The time of revenge has come." If there ever was a case where revenge is proper, this would seem to be one. The king begs for his life, to which Dîrghâyu replies, without any bitterness: "How can I grant you your life, O King, since my life is endangered by you? It is you, O King, who must grant me my life." In the end, each grants the other life, and, clasping hands, they swear not to harm each other. The young man now explains his father's last words, those which more especially concern us being these: "Not by hatred is hatred appeased; hatred is appeased by not-hatred." It means: "You have killed my father and mother, O King. If I should deprive you of life, then your partisans would deprive me of life. My

partisans again would deprive those of life. Thus by hatred hatred would not be appeased. But now, O King, you have granted me my life, and I have granted you your life; thus by not-hatred hatred has been appeased."

The same lesson reappears in the Laureate's verse, said to be founded on an Irish legend. A chieftain sails with his clan to revenge the death of his father; but as they come to the island of his enemy they are blown away across seas, and come one after another to marvelous islands and meet with wondrous adventures, and after fighting among themselves a little remnant come to the isle of a saint, who urges the chief to give up the strife.

His fathers have slain thy fathers, in war or in single strife;
Thy fathers have slain his fathers, each taken a life for a life;
Thy father had slain his father; how long shall the murder last?
Go back to the isle of Finn, and suffer the Past to be Past.

He obeys, and on the return voyage they come to the isle from which they had been blown;

and there on the shore was he, —
The man who had slain my father; I saw him and let him be.

VI

SOME OBJECTIONS

But, it may be objected, conceding that war is irrational, what is gained by demonstrating that fact? Do you suppose that men will stop fighting because it is foolish? Men may admit that anger is a brief madness, but they will get angry just the same. Grant that this all grows out of prejudice, shortsightedness, selfishness, pig-headedness, what you will, nevertheless this is a part of the limitation and environment of men, as much as their education and knowledge. As a practical matter, we have to take men as we find them. The time will come when men will realize the folly of fighting; but that time is far in the future. Until some practical means has been devised by which international differences can be settled justly and with honor to all parties, war must continue. It is not wrong for men to do the best they can. The Creator has not made men perfect, and as yet they have not attained to a high degree of wisdom. He has put into operation a principle of progress, which will indeed in the end banish war; but that happy time may be ages, eons, in the future. Meantime, the conditions which lead to war are not of man's making, but are prescribed by that Power which through a practical eternity has brought him by slow gradations up from the formless protoplasm to his present capacities. So here you have an objection based on good evolutionary grounds.

Very good. If war really originates not in the will of man but in the conditions imposed upon him from without, it is idle to argue the question of right or utility. It would be like discussing the moral aspects of the tornado, the earthquake, or the great geological upheavals and subsidences, making of a given area of the earth's surface now land and now sea. If, from the standpoint of Omniscience and regarding some far-off and vast design working out on lines which the human intellect cannot comprehend or even detect, there are utilities in these, they are such as do not seem to relate to the immediate interests of men or to the good of the individual at all. We cannot regard them as initial movements, originating in the immediate will of God, but as consequences of inconceivably vast forces put into play in the incredibly remote past, working out their results in accordance with their own nature, with no direct relation to the welfare of man. Life has simply adapted itself to or grown out of its conditions. Man takes things as he finds them and does the best he can, sometimes surviving and sometimes perishing in this conflict or play of forces.

If, indeed, we eliminate the human will from the question, we need argue no farther on either side. This is to dispose of the contention by eliminating its subject-matter, life being purely irresponsible and automatic. There can be neither utility nor right in action that is a matter of sheer necessity or mechanics. Thus, indeed, we may saddle the responsibility for war on the Author of the universe. It hardly need be pointed out that the same consideration would eliminate all responsibility from

individual human action. Law is based upon the assumption that the will controls the individual action, and when a case arises in which the will has not been exercised, as in an accident or where the person is incapable of reason and so of exercising discrimination, such a person is not held responsible for the consequence of his acts. I shall direct my argument only to such as believe that the will of man is as certainly in control of the movements leading to and directing wars as in any of the activities of life; that nations go to war because they want to, influenced by definite motives, from supposed advantage, or to gratify some feeling of animosity; that national quarrels come about exactly like individual quarrels, but, as I shall show, are far more controllable, certain prejudices aside, than the latter. It is not true that some unseen and irresistible power places nations in positions from which there is no escape save through the chances of battle, — which is, in another form, the proposition that war is a part of the order of nature.

I am under no constraint to prove that war will cease because it ought to. I believe it will, and that this may be much nearer at hand than the most hopeful have imagined. I believe that if a single generation could pass without war, the international court already provided by the Conference at The Hague having come in the meantime to be recognized as an actual fact, future wars between civilized nations would be impossible. As I write, however, there is nothing to indicate any such cheerful prospect, but rather the threat of more tremendous and appalling wars than the world has yet seen, the awful destructiveness of which may make men turn

to rational methods of settling future controversies. What I am held to show by my thesis is that war is irrational. I shall not argue that it is wrong. In the abstract this is almost everywhere admitted; but as the moral sentiment of a country exercises in times of passion no controlling force, this admission has no practical bearing. The moral loss to a community in the lowering of the whole tone of society, the blurring of the moral perceptions, the deadening of conscience, the disregard of the recognized distinctions between right and wrong, I shall pass over. They have been sufficiently emphasized by moralists already. What I desire, but can hope to do but slightly, is to convince men that war is unprofitable, a clumsy agency, which no longer serves a useful purpose and in the evolution of the race ought no longer to survive. If men ever become fully convinced that their interests are all subserved by peace, that they have nothing to gain by war but everything to lose, then war will cease.

On some points I shall agree with my adversary quickly. Prejudice, passion, self-interest are a part of the limitation of men, and must be taken into the account. It is not to be supposed that there will ever come a time when they will not exist, and indeed this might not be wholly desirable. Passion and self-interest, if not selfishness, are among the dynamics of life. They are the basis of motive and action. What men might be without them I do not know. Prejudice is merely the inclination to do the thing we have done and with which we are acquainted, the preference for the known over the unknown, which must always be a necessity in a life

of progress. It is often very exasperating to those who have passed beyond the phase of knowledge and experience in which it originated. It is often a serious check to progress, always acting as a brake, but it is also generally a safety-brake. As the race advances, the prejudices of to-day will disappear, but others will take their place and subserve the same uses and become the same hindrances with regard to still greater advances in the more distant future. Can we then hope for a time when misunderstandings and disputes will not arise? By no means. But when prejudice and self-interest shall urge the preservation of peace, the motives which now lead straight to war will be the forces to prevent it.

We must not expect men to act in advance of their knowledge. They cannot apply a principle before it is discovered. Liquefied air may perhaps in the future work an industrial revolution, but it is not irrational for men now to employ steam and electricity; but knowing these, if they were to return to the ox-cart for the transportation of goods and passengers, they would be irrational. Yet the latter means once represented an enormous advance over the time when man knew no other means of locomotion than his own legs, and when he carried his scanty belongings on his bare back. Rationality does not require that men do better than they know how, but only as well as they know. Its test is the employment of such means as man has to the accomplishment of useful ends. Men differ immensely in knowledge and capacity, but the savage and the weakling are still rational. Nations differ in the degree of their civilization and ability to supply their wants through

industry, but even in the most barbarous a high degree of rationality exists.

War is irrational not merely because it is wrong or cruel or a clumsy, uneconomical, and inept agency for settling differences, but because men knowing a better method still resort to it. Nay, they have actually employed the better in numberless cases, with an enormous saving of life and property. They see perfectly the desirability of employing it in all cases, and yet they do not do it. All men of course have not seen this, and it is not necessary to its employment that they should. Not all understand the steam engine and telephone. The nations are electing in this matter to use the ox-cart, for some occasions, when they might employ the railroad train. Imagine the cost of an international court to reach the extravagant sum of a million dollars a year; this would perhaps be one tenth of one per cent of the cost of the armaments made necessary under existing conditions. What, then, hinders its adoption for the settlement of all international questions? Self-interest should be the most powerful factor in its favor. Prejudice there may be, and distrust; yet we have seen how little these interfere with the peaceful conduct of commercial life, and how rapidly in fact they are disappearing. Honesty has come to be recognized as one of the most important factors in any large and permanent success. The intercourse of nations as such is less ingenuous than that between individuals of these nations; but there has been a great change within the last century. Diplomacy does not display its hand, but it does not carry, like Ah Sin, twenty-four packs of cards up its sleeves. A large amount of candor

now enters into it, and a large confidence is reposed in the pledge of a nation through its accredited agent. A few generations back statecraft was the embodiment of skillful lying, treachery, and deceit. Engagements were entered upon for the mere purpose of disarming suspicion, without the slightest intention of fulfillment. An alliance with one power would be made, and at the same moment an engagement entered into with a second, binding the nation to make war on the first. Its whole object was to conceal the intended move, so as to catch the other party off guard.

Now at the Peace Conference it was conceded generally that commercial and industrial questions could be profitably settled in an international court, but it was urged by many that there were questions of honor of which a nation must be its own judge. This is unquestionably the sore spot. Where it is a matter of interest only, a strong nation might gladly yield a valid right rather than contest it in war at a cost exceeding the value of the right. If "honor" is at stake, a weak nation, with the certainty of defeat, must fight. What then is a nation's honor, differing from that of a man, which it cannot intrust to the keeping of unprejudiced and disinterested judges, partly of its own choosing? We must go back once more to the life of individuals for our analogue.

Two boys, comrades and friends, fairly generous and just according to the standard of boys, differ in some trifling matter. They become excited and indulge in some warmth of expression, but as yet with no really hostile feeling. There is no ground for a quarrel, and left to themselves, a friendly composition would usually result.

The other boys know nothing and care nothing as to the merits of the controversy, but they dearly love a "scrap," for which there is a flattering prospect. "Fight, fight, form a ring!" is the cry as they gather about. Even now if there is a great disparity of strength and size, the one clearly superior may disappoint the spectators by declining to "thrash" the weaker, though the difficulties have been greatly increased. Finally, some one places a chip on the shoulder of one of the principals, and a settlement without blows becomes well-nigh impossible. Honor is at stake. One is dedicated to the defense of the chip, the other to the high emprise of knocking it off. To refuse to do what the code calls for is cowardice. The desired entertainment is not often long delayed. Next day the boys are as friendly as ever. With men the causes of difference are not quite the same, but they are frequently as trivial. Certain forms of expression are insults which must be wiped out in blood. Happily the courts give much opportunity for peaceful and vicarious abuse, and the bad blood is mostly worked off without the actual shedding of any, through attorneys paid for the purpose. Enlightened legislation has also attached such inconvenient incidents to the old method of wiping out insults that it has almost entirely disappeared, or goes no farther than an interchange of fisticuffs. No matter how angry a man may be, he is very apt to keep himself within the law, or at farthest so as to incur only such penalties — say small fines — as he can meet with little inconvenience, and which he considers only a fair equivalent for the satisfaction of beating his neighbor. His anger, in other words, if a brief madness, is not total

dementia, which latter, if shown, is a sufficient excuse in law for his acts. Unfortunately no means have yet been devised for laying similar restraints upon the temper of a nation, though there is no doubt that public sentiment everywhere now offers some restraint. If to this an actual penalty could attach, there is no reason to doubt that it would prove even more effectual for the preservation of peace between the nations than is the municipal law between individuals. For while perhaps a nation may become insane as well as an individual, its mania is never so complete. There is nearly always a large minority which does not share in the anger and does not lose its wits. This minority knows that it is likely to have to pay for the excesses of the majority, and seeks to keep it within the bounds of reason. The city of Pittsburg, some years back, was compelled to pay a large sum in damages for the act of a mob of strikers. Probably only a small per cent of the community was stark mad, and a still smaller proportion actually participated in the destruction of property.

But in what does the honor of a man in fact consist? Is it not in the living an honorable and upright life, in which his conduct is based on pure motives, justice, equity, fairness, reverence for the good, and hatred of meanness of every sort? Is it not the denial of these qualities that he mainly resents? How, then, is his honor assailed by some offensive epithet which a vulgar ruffian may throw at him? And how does a nation's honor differ from that of the citizen? In one respect the occasions for national offense are fewer than with individuals. Tempted by cupidity, one may make an

unjust demand upon another; but it rarely goes outside of the most studiously polite and courteous forms. Insults to flags, acts of aggression upon the rights of citizens, or violence to their persons, are by individuals, and rarely the act of a nation until a state of war actually exists. Now, every state is bound to repress the lawlessness of its citizens. It is also obliged to protect their rights. But if the one can secure the rights of its citizens, if the other can determine upon evidence in an impartial court the facts in dispute, in what conceivable way is the honor of either impugned by resorting to this court of reason rather than to the chance of war? Is it possible that it has vindicated its honor when, being the stronger, it has invaded the territory of its neighbor and subjected its population to indiscriminate outrage, pillage, hardship, and suffering, destroying the lives and property of those who not only had nothing to do with the insult upon which the question of honor hangs but also may have as heartily disapproved and repudiated it as the force thus turned upon them? If a man call me a coward, shall I prove my courage by beating his wife and children, who may have disapproved or apologized for his rudeness? A nation's honor, then, is not at stake, or rarely so. What we find is the spirit of bravado which refuses to let a chip be knocked from the shoulder. The nation must not "back down," or "haul down its flag," however wantonly or wrongly raised. To do so is "to show the white feather." Wrong a nation may endure, but it cannot allow another to imagine that it is afraid. It is the old, archaic, irrational courage which we have seen among the lower orders, surviving long after its

usefulness has passed away; the false and foolish pride in that which is not a subject for pride at all, a sullen, dogged persistence in a course after it is evident that it is neither just nor wise. To the false courage we must add the false patriotism, unmeaning, truculent, sanguinary, without use or reason. These will explain a great proportion of the wars which have ravaged the earth since human society began.

But while these primitive conceptions survive and are all powerful with the masses of men, it is yet true that war in the abstract is not approved even by these. In this country we found nearly universal disapproval of the South African War, one half of our people bitter against Great Britain as the selfish and wanton aggressor, and the other as strongly opposed to the Boers and blaming Kruger for actually beginning the war, whatever the rights in controversy, under the belief that temporarily he had the advantage and could crush the British troops before reënforcements could reach them. Few thought that the war should have taken place. We boiled with indignation that Spain should seek to hold a colony which had belonged to it for centuries, but saw no impropriety in ourselves acquiring a colony by force of arms, and subjugating its resisting people with awful slaughter. The simple fact is that the public sentiment, which is very generally right when uninfluenced by prejudice or self-interest, is absolutely untrustworthy in times of excitement and in matters where it is a party. In another generation it may bring itself to the point of view where it sees the past as others saw it when it was the present, but temporarily it has lost its reasoning

faculty, or is the subject of insane delusions. That the moral processes are inverted during a period of war has long been recognized, but that this is equally the case with the mental has not been sufficiently pointed out. That it would be so we ought indeed to expect, since the mind cannot be set off into compartments acting independently of each other, but is one and indivisible. Nevertheless we have somehow thought that men can be demoralized and still retain their mental powers intact. It would be as sensible to suppose that one could have heart disease without its affecting any other part of his body. A little calm study of the utterances of some of our best journals, ablest ministers, and most conscientious and clear-headed public men before the beginning of our late war with Spain and after it had begun will reveal such inconsistencies and contradictions as admit of no other explanation, unless we say that these men are hypocrites and mere shufflers, which I for one do not believe. It has long been recognized that the ablest historians are not to be trusted when dealing with a war in which their own country has had part. For a like but still more potent reason we are always reminded at the close of a war that the time has not come to write its history. But surely, so far as knowledge of the facts, sources of information, motives, causes, and principles goes, that of all times would seem to be the most favorable. It is, however, the fact that veritable history cannot be written by any one whose passions have been enlisted in it, until his mental and moral balance have been regained.

The masses of men do not reason at all on the subject of war. They act as their remote ancestry in the

prehistoric past acted when the occasion presented itself. It is a mere impulse growing out of prejudice. They are not to be too severely blamed for it. This prejudice represents the stage of progress to which they have attained, and it is idle to ask them to act upon considerations which will actuate men in some future age. A nation stands no more chance of acting on rational grounds when the hot blood is up than does the individual under the same conditions. What then? The individual is born into a social status in which laws, customs, and established tribunals intervene between him and his crazy impulses. The burning questions which arise between him and his neighbor will not be settled between the two, save by all the other neighbors acting through the law. Philip sober confronts Philip drunk and faces him down. It is not unusual for those who are subject to violent and uncontrollable paroxysms of rage and fury, forewarned of the approach of one, to ask to be put under restraint. Ulysses, assured that his reason would be no safeguard against the song of the sirens, had himself lashed to the mast. It would seem to be the part of wisdom for a nation, knowing these things, while still in the possession of its faculties, to put itself under bonds for its good behavior. If really convinced that war no longer subserves the interests of the race, but is the greatest hindrance in its conquest of nature, the great and ever-increasing burden that weights it down, it would seem easy when at peace, when their honor — that ghastly specter which haunts their uneasy dreams — is wholly satisfied and may even in appearance be preserved, for the nations to enter into an agreement

through which war would be no longer recognized as a possible agency in the settlement of future disagreements. They have, however, up to now, refused. It is possible that they think this might put them to some disadvantage; but if we have correctly reasoned thus far, war will always put them to a greater one, questions of "honor" aside, than any which they could suffer in a court or through arbitration. The real reason must be that, while each nation recognizes war in general to be a losing game whichever way it goes, it still thinks that in some particular case which may arise it might reap a profit or desirable end of some sort, a gain in territory, in credit, or in satisfaction. The latter may accrue even in case of a disastrous defeat. If honor is preserved, it is enough. It is the case of a boy who has been knocked down, choked, pommeled, bruised, and battered until his mother hardly knows him, who while convalescing in bed grimly consoles himself with the thought that he scratched his antagonist's face.

But granting the possibility in a given instance of a material gain by one of the combatants at the expense of the other, it will be difficult, in modern times at least, to point to an actual instance of it. The most favorable example which could be mentioned is doubtless that of the English conquest of India; and yet so good an authority as Goldwin Smith and multitudes besides doubt whether this has been profitable. If this had been the indispensable condition of the trade between the countries, possibly we may figure out a benefit. The world stood aghast at the indemnity which Germany compelled France to pay. It probably did not nearly

cover the expenses of the war, and certainly has paid a very small fraction of the expense of the great armament which she has been compelled to maintain ever since, and which grows year by year. She also received territory which had once been hers, but which had become French in interests and feeling. In what way did this benefit the German people? It added certainly to the aggregate wealth of the German Empire, but it added in a like ratio to its necessities. It added nothing, of course, to the wealth of the world, and nothing to that of individual Germans. Even to the revenues of the state it added nothing which is not counterbalanced by an increased expenditure. It did furnish additional war material; but if war is an injury, then this simply means additional means of injuring itself and others. It raised an almost implacable hatred, a deeply settled purpose on the part of the French to be revenged. It has held an unwilling people, whose opposition is perhaps with a new generation beginning to die out. Commercially and industrially there was, it must be clear to the slightest reflection, no advantage which could not have been secured by equitable trade relations. For whatever view we may take as to the desirability or necessity of tariffs for the sake of protection or for the encouragement of home manufacture, no one surely will claim that the addition to the price of an article adds anything to its actual value for human use, or that for this purpose it makes any difference whether it is produced under one political jurisdiction or another. It may be said that these equitable trade relations cannot be had except through war. It would certainly be difficult to show

that a country has ever voluntarily conceded trade advantages to one which has beaten it in war. If actually conquered and annexed, the whole matter of trade concessions of course vanishes with the elimination of one of the traders.

Probably a great many intelligent persons believe that the great activity which frequently follows a war is a compensation, and even more, for its losses. It is only, in fact, an illustration of the law of supply and demand, registering the increased waste and consumption of the war, with a diminished production during the same period. We witness the same phenomena every few years from purely commercial causes. The same thing is observable in disasters from fire, flood, and earthquake. The recovery of Chicago from almost total destruction of its business was a great surprise. Would it have been still more advantageous if the balance of its property had also been swept away? If so, the maintenance of a fire department is an expensive mistake. Would it not have been well to have burned the rest of our cities while we were about it? And about how often should this process be repeated?

Now, there is just enough of truth in all this absurdity to make the idea dangerous to those whose reasoning is superficial. *Post hoc, propter hoc*, is as far as many can go. The reconstruction of a city or district is, in fact, beneficial to *some* people. Material furnishers and workmen may reap an advantage, though they probably have lost more in the destruction than they will gain. A shipwreck is a benefit to the beach combers. Physicians profit from disease, and dentists from toothache. But

none of these things adds anything to the world's store of wealth, which means things which it desires to use. It may help to redistribute wealth; but this is also true of theft and robbery. If war really has added anything to the world's production, except the agencies for further destruction, we ought from this logic to desire perpetual warfare.

It is quite true that where a city like Chicago has been destroyed, a new and more magnificent one will take its place. The ground is clear, and the new city will represent the advance during the period since the first building. Each generation profits by the experience of those which have preceded it. A building is planned to meet a certain want and designed for specific uses. Sooner or later the conditions change, and it is no longer adapted to these. It is less useful than its competitors and is no longer fitted to survive. It is taken down and another fills its place. The process is going on in all our cities, in some more rapidly than in others. It is only a question of time, and not very long either, when the existing Chicago will all give way to a still newer. It is sheer lunacy, however, which can imagine the total destruction of a city to be a benefit to the world. There is no way in which the destruction of the products of industry can be beneficial so long as they are capable of subserving their intended uses. When they have become obsolete peace itself destroys or reconstructs them to adapt them more completely to designed uses. War and peace are simply antithetical or antagonistic forces, their processes opposite, their aims as different as life and death. They can never be

brought into harmony and relationship with each other. War annihilates the products of peace. Peace, in turn, destroys the destructions of war by restoring her own. And if it were true that war made the arts of peace still more effectual, we should still be obliged to say that the benefits of war come not in war but in not-war. While the fighting goes on all energies are bent to destruction only; when it is over all are employed in construction and distribution. War is a benefit, therefore, to the extent to which it does not exist. It is the exact duplicate of the schoolboy's idea that pins have saved the lives of a great many people by their not swallowing them.

It still should be noted, though I may not dwell upon this point, that in the exceptional cases where war is a benefit to a particular person or class, like famine, pestilence, shipwreck, fire, and earthquake, the benefit is usually much less than is supposed. The farmers at the North very commonly thought that the Civil War was a benefit to them through the rise in the price of farm products. Taking into the account the increased cost of machinery, tools, labor, and family supplies, taxes direct and indirect, this was a complete delusion. It was in reality an enormous burden, eased somewhat by distribution through many years. In any case, whatever the advantage to the farmer, it was offset by the disadvantage to the consumer. It was largely illusory at best, as these were the prices in a depreciated currency, which was one of the fruits of the war. But in whatever way we turn it about, we shall find that the advantages accrued not to the war but to the not-war, while the loss

and injury were chargeable to the war, not to the pursuits of peace. It may be conceded that a neutral nation does derive a temporary advantage from the calamities of its neighbors engaged in war. In the long run it, in common with organized and mutually dependent human labor and effort, must help to make good the loss from destruction and the negative result of withdrawing so much labor from productive industries.

It is idle to prolong this discussion, or to multiply illustrations. If the matter is not already clear, I believe nothing will make it so. If the reason is perverted by preconceptions which hold themselves out as religion, duty, patriotism, or what not good thing, appealing to the conscience, sophisticated or unenlightened though it be, there is no opening to such a mind. All that can be done is to exercise the other virtues, — patience and hope. After all there is progress. From the dawn of life the tendency is steadily in one direction. There have seemed to be long halts; there have been seeming, not actual, retrogressions, — eddies in the mighty stream whose onward sweep is unperceived. There has been no change of direction, no backward turn. Slowly, imperceptibly, imperturbably, like any growth, reason widens her domain. Civilization and Christianity are one. From absolute antagonism, universal and ceaseless combat, implacable hatred and unconditioned selfishness, the law of life has evolved combination, interdependence, sympathy, and common interests. "Moreover it will not be in my day," said Hezekiah, concerning the calamity which was to come to his nation. Not in ours will come the crowning glory to the human race. But while those who

have striven for truth and rationality fall away, others press into their places. Truth is not lost, nor is it in danger. The day is dawning, and there is light in the sky. By and by the sun will gild first the high and secret mountain tops, and then spread downward to the plains, and finally flood every valley and glen and savage chasm, and the shadows of the long and dismal night will flee away.